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Abstract
In this essay, which has been published in two parts, the author argues that the Meech Lake Accord was more
than a hastily cobbled together political deal between the Prime Minister and ten provincial premiers. Despite
the unattractive process by which the Meech Lake Accord was struck, and especially defended, despite the
disingenuous character of the arguments most often advanced for its adoption, and despite its close
connection with other aspects of the federal government's political agenda which many Canadians found
suspicious, the Meech Lake Accord did respond to an important issue in post-patriation constitutionalism. A
review of Canadian constitutional history, the evolution of French and English linguistic minorities in Canada,
and the complementary motifs of French-Canadian and English-Canadian survivance leads the author to
conclude that the forces which generated the Meech Lake Accord have been perennial features of "British
North American" political life since 1759. The symbolic purpose of the Meech Lake Accord was to illustrate
that, notwithstanding significant demographic and economic changes in Canada, and notwithstanding that
the patriation exercise operated a profound transformation of the complex underpinnings of Canadian
federalism, these traditional forces would still play a significant role in defining the values of the country. The
failure of the Meech Lake Accord does not mean that these forces are now spent. Rather, it means only that
the present "federal" structure within which they have been accommodated since 1867 probably is no longer
appropriate for the task. The author concludes with a prognosis for what the institutional redesign likely to
emerge over the next few years will be - a framework he characterizes as "heteronomy."
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol29/iss3/3
...MEECH LAKE TO THE CONTRARY
NOTWITHSTANDING
(PART II)°
RODERICK A. MACDONALD*
In this essay, which has been published in two parts, the
author argues that the Meech Lake Accord was more than a hastily
cobbled together political deal between the Prime Minister and ten
provincial premiers. Despite the unattractive process by which the Meech
LakeAccord was struck, and especially defended, despite the disingenuous
character of the arguments most often advanced for its adoption, and
despite its close connection with other aspects of the federal government's
political agenda which many Canadians found suspicious, the Meech Lake
Accord did respond to an important issue in post-patriation
constitutionalism.
A review of Canadian constitutional history, the evolution of
French and English linguistic minorities in Canada, and the comple-
mentary motifs of French-Canadian and English-Canadian survivance
leads the author to conclude that the forces which generated the Meech
Lake Accord have been perennial features of "British North American"
C Copyright, 1991, Roderick A. Macdonald
Of the Faculty of Law and the Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University.
Given that the entire essay is a revision of the Laskin Lecture on Public Law delivered
on 8 November 1989, its organization and tone continue to reflect the argument in favour of
the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord that was then made. Nevertheless, many of the
points raised in this half of the essay have been rewritten into the past tense, even though
they were, in fact, signalled prior to the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. On occasion this
rewriting into the past tense causes me some embarrassment (in that the text is both more
discursive and more polemical than would be appropriate in a footnoted essay published as
a post-mortem), but I have decided to leave the text more or less as originally written. Where
it has been necessary to rewrite parts of the essay to reflect the failure of the ratification
process (which is especially the case in section VII - originally devoted to assessing various
strategies for achieving ratification between 8 November 1989 and 23 June 1990), this
rewriting is clearly indicated, and the original arguments are summarized in the footnotes.
1 Part I, comprising sections I - III, appears in (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ. 253.
Addendum to Part I: an important bibliographic source was omitted from footnote 92. R.
Rudin, The Forgetten Quebecers: A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1980 (Quebec:
Institut Qu~bdois de recherche sur la culture, 1985) provides a comprehensive account of the
role and influence of Quebec's English-speaking population and provides detailed graphs and
charts showing the demographic evolution of that minority.
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political life since 1759. The symbolic purpose of the Meech LakeAccord
was to illustrate that, notwithstanding significant demographic and
economic changes in Canada, and notwithstanding that the patriation
exercise operated a profound transformation of the complex under-
pinnings of Canadian federalism, these traditional forces would still play
a significant role in defining the values of the country.
The failure of the Meech LakeAccord does not mean that these
forces are now spent. Rather, it means only that the present "federal"
structure within which they have been accomodated since 1867 probably
is no longer appropriate for the task. The author concludes with a
prognosis for what the institutional redesign likely to emerge over the
next few years will be - a framework he characterizes as "heteronomy."
IV. LA SURVIVANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL
M OTIFS ................................................. 484
V. THE MEANING OF MEECH LAKE: CONSTITUTIONAL SYMBOLS ... 511
VI. BILL 178, THE SECTION 33 OVERRIDE, AND THE DISTINCT
SOCIETY CLAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS ................. 524
VII. THE RATIFICATION IMPASSE: CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS ...... 546
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................ 567
IV. LA SURVIVANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL MOTIFS
In an ideal polity there would be few bigots and fewer
xenophobes. People would rejoice in linguistic and cultural
diversity.2 Members of majorities would even attempt, through their
support of various cultural activities, to cross-subsidize minorities,
rather than by their passivity, allow the reverse to occur. Policy-
makers would be able to distinguish real threats to weaker cultures
from harmless bogeymen, and having done so, would propound
2 For a superlative analysis of the difference between language and ethnicity, and the
implications for political theory of recognizing the claims of "ethnicity," see W. Kymlicka,
"Liberalism and the Politicization of Ethnicity" (Address to McGill University, October 1990)
[unpublished paper on file with the author]. See also, for a more detailed treatment of these
underlying themes, W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989) [hereinafter Liberalism].
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national motifs which call forth openness, not defensiveness. Most
importantly, politicians would not seek to curry popular favour by
simply refusing to carve out an identifiable position, or by playing
to the fears and prejudices of their electorate.
Such, however, is not the Canada within which we live today.
Indeed, many popular movements and organizations - for example,
the Alliance for the Preservation of English in Canada and the
Confederation of Regions Party on the one hand, and Soci6t6 Saint-
Jean-Baptiste and the Mouvement Qu6bec-Frangais on the other -
seem to share an eagerness to uncover dark linguistic conspiracies
and, by ricochet, promote ignorance and intolerance. Moreover, it
is rare, even among those English-speaking Canadians outside
Quebec of tolerance and good will, that the effort is made to
support French-language endeavours in their communities; only a
few regularly listen to or watch Radio-Canada, purchase records and
books published in French, or attend concerts, movies, or exhibitions
offered in that language, with the consequence that the market for
the cultural products of Canada's minority official language remains
perilously small. Finally, a disturbing number of politicians in both
majority and minority language groups pursue formal rather than
substantive legislative goals. In their quest, they typically seek to
limit, control, and suppress perceived threats rather than to nurture
or promote the threatened object.
It is this last feature of Canadian political life, as translated
by a preoccupation with the formal over the substantive, which will
be addressed particularly in this section. Some commentators claim
that it is the pursuit of purely formal symbols which lay behind the
agenda which resulted in the Meech Lake Accord, just as it was the
desire to suppress perceived, but not real, threats which grounded
language legislation such as Bill 1013 and Bill 1784 in Quebec.5
3 The Charter of the French Language R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11 [hereinafter La Charte de la
langue frangaise or Bill 101].
4 An Act to Amend the Charter of the French Language, S.Q. 1988, c. 54 [hereinafter Bill
178].
5 For a thorough demolition of these pretexts see P. Fournier, "L'Echec du Lac Meech:
un point de vue qu~bcois" in R.L. Watts & D. Brown, eds, Canada: The State of the
Federation, 1990 (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University,
1990). See also, P. Monahan, After Meech Lake: An Insider's View (Kingston, Ont.: Institute
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 29 NO. 3
Thus, it is argued that both these initiatives of the Quebec
government - the one ostensibly directed to enhancing Quebec's
constitutional position, the other ostensibly directed to promoting
French language and culture within Quebec - generally fail to
address the most pressing challenges faced by French-speaking
Canadians. To test the accuracy of these assessments of Quebec's
present political agenda (an agenda it has pursued relentlessly over
the past thirty years), and to analyze the long-term impact of this
agenda on Quebec's English-speaking minority,6 it is helpful to recur
to the motif of la survivance. This powerful motif has shaped the
consciousness of French-speaking Canadians ever since the conquest
in 1763. 7
A good point of entry for any discussion of the relationship
of la survivance to contemporary (that is, post-Charter)8 political
of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1990) [hereinafterAfter Meech Lake] for
a further discussion of this theme.
6 It should be remembered that this essay is conceived, not as a complete analysis of
Canada's current constitutional conundrums, but rather is intended to evoke these dilemmas
from the perspective of English-speaking Quebec, and to serve as a counterpoint to the
"media-generated" image of this community as an embattled and oppressed minority.
7 The classic source is L. Groulx, Histoire du Canada-frangais (Montreal: Fides, 1960).
For a superb analytical essay which situates this theme in historical context see C. Dufour,
Le d&fi Qudb'cois: Essai (Montreal: Hexagone, 1989). Surprisingly, while French-speaking
Canadians have always been open about their fidelity to the idea of survival, English-speaking
Canadians have been more reticent to acknowledge this groundwork of their nationalism. Yet
the same idea has also shaped the consciousness of English-speaking Canadians since the late
eighteenth century. In the form of the United Empire Loyalist myth, survival of a British
North America against the American empire is the raison d'etre of the country. See for
representative examples, G. Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965); W. Gordon, A Choice for Canada (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1966); T. Lloyd & J. McLeod, eds, Agenda 1970: Proposals for a
Creative Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968); 1. Lumsden, ed., Close the 49th
Parallel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968); and P. Berton, Why We Act Like
Canadians: A Personal Exploration of Our National Character (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 1982). See also M. Atwood, Survival (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981). The
impact of the survival motif on the reaction of many English-speaking Canadians outside
Quebec to the Meech Lake Accord will be examined in the next section of this essay. For the
moment, it is sufficient to note that while Pierre Turdeau understood how to play to English-
speaking Canadian nationalism, he never did reconcile himself to Quebec nationalism.
Conversely, while Brian Mulroney early on reconciled himself to Quebec nationalism, he never
understood English-speaking Canadian nationalism. For further discussion, see below at 561ff.
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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activity is the list of Quebec's minimum demands as set out in the
Meech Lake Accord, and the threats to French language and culture
in Canada which these demands were thought to palliate. In the
paragraphs which follow, the initial concerns of the Quebec
government will be kept separate from those advanced by other
provinces, and from those provisions of the Meech Lake Accord
which might be seen to have had their origin in unsolicited federal
largesse?9 As a reflection of the survival motif, there is no doubt
that the most important symbolic concern of the Quebec
government was the recognition, through the "distinct society" clause,
of the province's social and constitutional uniqueness °  The
function of this clause in providing a structure of interpretation for
the constitution which would acknowledge the special responsibility
of the Quebec government in promoting French language and
culture in Canada will be addressed in the next section of this essay.
For the moment, attention will be directed to four of the other five
issues which Quebec brought to the First Ministers' Meeting at
Meech Lake in 1987: immigration, the Supreme Court, the
spending power, and the amending formula.1 1 Each of these will be
briefly noted, followed by an assessment of the extent to which the
terms of the Meech Lake Accord actually address the concern in
question.
The reason for including the first of these issues,
immigration, flows from apprehension about the demographics of a
declining birth rate in Quebec and the relation of immigration to
9 For a statement of the position of the Quebec government see the declaration by Gil
Rdmillard, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, presented at Mont Gabriel on 9 May 1986.
10 The concept of "socidt6 distincte" was, in effect, the mid-1980s version of a long
succession of slogans meant to signal the constitutional importance of the compact view of the
British North American political state. It thus has strong emotive roots with the "deux
nations" concept of Daniel Johnson, infra, note 47, but not with the "deux peuples fondateurs"
motif of the post-1968 federal government. For a more detailed elaboration of the
constitutional consequences of these motifs see section II of this essay, supra, note 1 at 261.
11 There were initially six points raised by the Mont Gabriel declaration. But one, that
provincial governments recognize in the Constitution the rights of French-speaking Canadians
outside Quebec, was abandoned because of the opposition of the Western Premiers during the
negotiations at Meech Lake. In other words, the sacrifice of this condition was a further
reflection of the transformation of the initial compact idea into a more states rights theory
of English-French relations in the federation. See supra, note 1 at 298-306.
1991] 487
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these demographics.1 2  What in many European countries is
euphemistically called "population policy" currently falls within
provincial jurisdiction as a matter of property and civil rights. But
under section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, immigration is a
shared jurisdiction in respect of which federal legislation is
paramount. How, it has long been argued in Quebec, can the
province organize its population policy, and thereby maintain its
linguistic and cultural distinctiveness (that is, its visage frangais) in
the face of massive immigration over which it has little effective
control? Two aspects of this concern about Canadian immigration
policy predominate even today. In the first place, whether due to
federal immigration initiatives or not, for several decades Quebec
has failed to attract a population-proportionate share of immigrants
to Canada. Hence the fear that the weight of its voice in the
national political arena, as measured by its number of seats in
Parliament, will steadily diminish.13
But the problem for Quebec is not just that most immigrants
to Canada seek to join what they perceive as the economic
mainstream, and, therefore, do not settle in Quebec. It is also that
most immigrants even to Quebec (especially in the post-World War
II period) have wanted to learn English and to affiliate with that
culture by becoming English-speaking Quebeckers. Canada is
conceived by most immigrants as an English-speaking country, and
this is a perception which, it is claimed, federal immigration offices
overseas often unconsciously promote. These two consequences of
Canadian immigration policy have been apparent at least since
Clifford Sifton's initiatives in the century's first decade. They were
to provoke profound disagreements between Quebec City and
Ottawa during the late 1940s and early 1950s, as well as from the
late 1960s to the present.14
12 For an excellent analysis see D. Bonin, "L'immigration au Qudbec en 1990: A I'hcure
des choix" in Watts & Brown, supra, note 5 at 137 and D. Latouche, "Le pluralisme ethnique
et l'agenda public au Qudbec" (1989) 61 Rev. inter. d'action communautaire 11.
13 Between 1867 and 1980, Quebee's share of the population of Canada declined from
well over one-third to just over one-quarter, and its representation in the House of Commons
from 65 of 181 seats to 75 of 292 seats.
14 For a summary of Canadian immigration policy, see J. Atchison, "Immigration in Two
Federations" in B. Hodgins et al, eds, Federalism in Canada and Australia: Historical
488 [voL 29 No. 3
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Compounding the Quebec government's purely numerical
concerns about immigration policy is a major social concern about
the "assimilation" of immigrants. Only since the late 1940s, and
especially only since the 1970s, has Quebec experienced a major
wave of non-British Isles immigrants, almost all of whom settled in
the Montreal region. Moreover, although most new immigrant
groups were from southern European countries where the Roman
Catholic religion was dominant, these groups nevertheless found
their primary attachment within Quebec to the English-speaking
minority. As a result, to a degree not experienced in the United
States and most of the rest of Canada over the same decades,
French-speaking Quebec (even in the Montreal region) remained an
essentially unicultural society. This means that the province does
not have a history of accommodating itself to immigrants. Even in
more recent years, when French-speaking immigrants from South-
East Asia, Lebanon, North Africa, or Haiti have begun to become
established in Quebec, there have been difficult problems of
assimilation (or integration).
The standard problems of assimilating immigrants are
exacerbated in the case of Quebec because many French-speaking
Canadians see both their language and culture as being directly
threatened by immigration. It is, unfortunately, widely believed that
a multicultural francophonie in Quebec may lessen the capacity of
French culture to resist domination by English-Canadian and
American culture. For many French-speaking Quebeckers, the
notion of multiculturalism, like the notion of bilingualism which
accompanied it, is believed to be an English-speaking North
American colonizing concept. Several events during the latter stages
of the Meech Lake Accord ratification exercise revealed this fear of
multiculturalism: the president of the Qu6bec Chambre de
Commerce questioned whether the French-Canadian race can survive
current levels of non-white immigration; the Commission des tcoles
Catholiques de Montr6al circulated questionnaires asking parents
whether they would prefer that immigrant children be segregated
into separate classes; and a former cabinet minister hosted a major
Perspectives: 1920-1988 (Peterborough, Ont.: Frost Centre for Canadian Heritage &
Development Series, Trent University, 1989) 200.
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television documentary about immigration provocatively entitled
"Disparattre."
Whether or not one is prepared to dismiss at least some of
these concerns and incidents as flowing from ignorance based on a
lack of exposure to the phenomenon, it is clear that the issues of
immigration and immigration policy are of real concern in Quebec.
The imbalance in English and French-speaking immigration, and the
understandable desire of many allophone immigrants to Quebec to
learn English, is both a cause and a symptom of Quebec's
demographic apprehensions. Yet it is also clear that, in the absence
of an evolution in the attitudes of French-speaking Quebec towards
the multicultural francophonie likely to result from the assimilation
of more immigrants, the provisions of the Meech Lake Accord would
not adequately have addressed these concerns. For example, while
the Cullen-Couture formula15 may assist the government of Quebec
in recruiting French-speaking immigrants to Quebec and integrating
them into Quebec society, it is difficult to see how a constitution
can guarantee that a specified minimum percentage of immigrants
will either choose to locate in Quebec, or decide to remain there
and to retain an identification with the French language and culture.
Nor is it immediately apparent how constitutionalizing the Cullen-
Couture formula through the proposed addition to the Constitution
Ac4 1867 of sections 95A through 95E would have overcome fears
of multiculturalism and the possible transformation of North
American Francophone culture through immigration.1 6 Nevertheless,
the further specification of already shared jurisdiction over
immigration which the Meech Lake Accord offered did acknowledge
the special importance of immigration policy to Canada's linguistic
minority. It was, therefore, a powerful symbol to a Quebec
preoccupied with demographic issues.
15 The Cullen-Couture formula was an intergovernmental agreement signed on 20
February 1978, by Jacques Couture, Quebec Immigration Minister, and Bud Cullen, Federal
Immigration Minister. It was renewed every three years thereafter. Its basic principles were
picked up in the Meech Lake Accord in the proposed sections 95A through 95E of the
Constitution Act, 1867.
16 This point is all the more evident since proposed section 95B(3) subjects any
intergovernmental agreements on immigration to the Charter, and, in particular, to section 6
on "mobility rights." For commentary, see P.W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord
Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) at 21-25.
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A second threat to la survivance thought to have been
addressed by the Meech Lake Accord relates to the structure of
federal institutions, and to Quebec's place in the country's political
arena. With a shrinking percentage of Canada's population, many
provincial politicians came to fear that Quebec's influence in
Canadian public affairs was declining and would continue to do so
even more rapidly in the future. This perception existed
notwithstanding that with the exception of less than twenty years
since Confederation, and only two years in the past seventy, the
party holding the most seats in Quebec had formed the federal
government. Indeed, for all but twelve of the last forty-three years
the Prime Minister of Canada has represented a Quebec
constituency 1 8 Moreover, as Western Canadians are quick to point
out (wrongly in fact), the federal political agenda often seems to be
driven by the need to cater to Quebec, as witness the special
treatment of hydroelectricity in the National Energy Program, and
the allocation of the F-18 contract to a Montreal aerospace
company. Nevertheless, Quebec provincial politicians do not see
either of the above federal decisions as relevant to the claims they
make about their declining influence in Canadian affairs.19
The perception of a lack of real power, despite the
Trudeau-era slogan "French power" feeds the demand for additional
non-"rep-by-pop" constitutional adjustments to purely federal
institutions. Rather than political empowerment through
constitutional guarantees visited upon individuals, Quebec elites
typically have sought institutional redesign as a means of
compensating for an anticipated waning in the political influence
17 The exceptions were the Mackenzie government (1873-1878), the Borden governments
(1911-1921), the Bennett government (1930-1935), the first Diefenbaker government (1957-
58), and the Clark government (1979). For a statistical analysis of elections prior to 1972 see
J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-
Hall, 1968).
18 None of John Diefenbaker (1957-63), Lester Pearson (1963-68), Joe Clark (1979), or
John Turner (1984) represented a Quebec constituency.
19 The failure in many parts of Western Canada to dissociate the federal agenda of
Prime Minister Trudeau from that of the Quebec government means that many common
sources of frustration with the federal government go unrecognized. For a brief discussion
see G. Robertson, Does Canada Matter? (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental
Relations, 1990) at 4-7.
1991]
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which can be wielded by Mws from Quebec. Those who hold to the
just recited facts about the base of support of parties holding power
federally is evidence that Quebec's fear of marginalization is
unjustified need look no further than the United States between
1840 and 1860 for a lesson that population ultimately drives politics.
Even as late as the Dred Scott20 decision in the 1850s, the South's
political hegemony looked reasonably secure. Ten years later the
Confederacy was devasted and the South's influence on national
affairs was negligible.
The claim that several federal institutions are in need of
restructuring reflects one response to this concern. In this respect
the Meech Lake Accord themes of Senate reform and Supreme
Court reform actually share a common root, even though the former
was never on the Quebec agenda. The result of the Meech Lake
Accord process as concerns the Senate was, moreover, hardly
responsive to Quebec's position on the reform of federal
institutions. 21 If anything, the Meech Lake Accord's provisions
respecting the Senate would likely have resulted, in any future round
of constitutional negotiations, in a direct conflict between Alberta
and Quebec over the political function of the Senate and the
representative structure needed to fulfil that function. In 1867, the
Senate was conceived, at least in part, to reflect regional, not
provincial, interests in such a way that Quebec would always control
about one-third of its membership. Given the minimal political role
the Senate soon came to play, Quebec could afford to see its
relative representation within that body decline over the past
century. But a Triple-E Senate 22 - especially were it to be equal
(on a provincial, not regional basis) and effective (in shaping the
Parliamentary legislative agenda) - would be directly opposed to
20 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For a review of this era in American
political life, see J. MacPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantyne Books, 1988)
c. 1-7.
21 For analysis, see Hogg, supra, note 16 at 16-20.
22 For a brief explanation of the Triple-E Senate Plan and the relationship of the Meech
Lake Accord to it, see D. Elton, 'The Enigma of Meech Lake for Senate Reform" and P.
McCormick, "Senate Reform: Forward Step or Dead End?" in R. Gibbins, ed., Meech Lake
and Canada. Perspectives from the West (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing,
1988) 22 and 33, respectively [hereinafter Perspectives From the West].
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Quebec's interests. For it would rest on a "states rights" (or
provincial egalitarian) rather than a compact (or compact tempered
with regionalism) view of Canadian federalism, a conception which
denies Quebec's special role as a province within the federation.
More importantly, a Triple-E Senate would also further diminish the
already declining influence of Quebec representatives in the federal
legislative process.
As for the redesign of the Supreme Court, the proposals set
out in the Meech Lake Accord show very clearly the complexity of
Quebec's concerns. 23 For over twenty-five years, Quebec had sought
some extended and formalized input into Supreme Court
appointments, or even some restriction on the Court's jurisdiction
over private law matters, primarily on the basis of the distinctiveness
of the civil law and the particular impact of the Court's division of
powers jurisprudence on Quebec.24 With the advent of the Charter
and the "publicization" of the Court's agenda, the need to legislate
a limitation on private law appeal rights or to increase the number
of civil law jurists on the Supreme Court has diminished in
importance. But, at the same time, the Charter means that a new
and important dimension of policy-making in relation to language
and education has devolved to the Court. This increases, as far as
Quebec is concerned, the reasons for substantial input into the
appointments process. 25 Indeed, since 1949, there has sometimes
been a discernible cleavage in the constitutional, quasi-constitutional,
and civil law opinions of Quebec and non-Quebec judges, even when
the former are drawn from among elements in the Quebec bar most
sympathetic to the federal agenda. Ensuring that Quebec's
23 Once again, for analysis of the entire panoply of amendments relating to the Supreme
Court, see Hogg, supra, note 16 at 27-36. For a Quebec perspective, particularly on the
appointments process, see G.-A. Beaudoin, La Constitution du *Canada: Institutions, partage
despouvoirs, droits et Iibert~s (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1990) at 830-34, and sources cited
at footnote 34 therein [hereinafter La Constitution du Canada].
24 See G.E. LeDain, "Concerning the Proposed Constitutional and Civil Law
Specialization at the Supreme Court Level" (1967) 2 RJ.T. 107.
25 The various aspects of this question are addressed in G.-A. Beaudoin, ed., La Cour
suprene du Canada (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 1986), especially by the papers by
Franfois Chevrette and Yves de Montigny therein.
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distinctive voice continues to be heard in the policy discussions of
the court became, consequently, an important objective.
From the 1960s onward, there appear to have been at least
three dimensions to Quebec's plea for reforming the Supreme Court.
Historically, the most cogent of these has been its concern with
preserving the integrity of civil law as such.26  Yet, even
acknowledging that common law jurists on the Court have frequently
misinterpreted the Civil Code, there is no absolute reason to require
the conflation of the goal of preserving the civil law with the
interests of the government of Quebec in its role as protector of
French language and culture. This is especially true given that the
civil law of Quebec is not a pure tradition and given that it has
been developed and practised by both French and English-speaking
Canadians.
The second dimension of Quebec's distinctiveness claim as
it has related to the Supreme Court concerns language. If Quebec
is the primary locus of the French language and culture (including
legal culture) in Canada, then it should have a particular
responsibility for ensuring the number and the quality of French-
speaking jurists appointed to the Court. Once again, however, there
is no reason to conflate this concern with the interests of the
Quebec government. While in the past, one of the three civil law
seats on the Court was typically held by an English-speaking jurist,
since the retirement of Justice Douglas Abbott twenty years ago, all
three Quebec seats have been filled by Francophones. Moreover,
the case for Quebec exercising a special role in the nomination of
Francophone jurists is less compelling today in view of the
recognition of the constitutional status of Acadians, Franco-
Ontarians, and Franco-Manitobans. Today members of each of
these minorities serve on provincial courts of appeal in all three
provinces.
If, however, the concern is with protecting Quebec's
distinctive political interests in the Charter era, the mechanics of the
Supreme Court nomination process assume a major significance in
26 For an elaboration of this theme see J.L Baudouin, "L'interprdtation du Code civil
qudbocois par la Cour supreme du Canada" (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 715.
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maintaining Quebec's place in federal institutions2 7  Yet, as with
the immigration issue, it is far from obvious that the appointment
formula of the Meech Lake Accord actually addressed this third issue
(or indeed any of the three concerns raised in the text) in a
meaningful way. For unless the ultimate object of the exercise was
to reduce the role of the Court to that of a legislative delegate, it
is uncertain that a doubling of political input into judicial selection
would ensure a Supreme Court more responsive to Quebec's special
concerns. As long as jurists from other provinces have an adequate
understanding of the French language and a keen awareness of the
particularities of the civil law, the existing reservation of three seats
to members and former members of the Bar of Quebec ought to
meet adequately the systemic concern.28 Furthermore, it is uncertain
that even three seats on a court of nine will generate either a
significant rebalancing of the Court's division of powers
jurisprudence or a heightened sensitivity to those linguistic and
cultural preoccupations of Quebec which might seem to conflict with
Charter rights, even were these three judges to be radical
decentralists. Here again, however, the symbolism of participation
in the appointment of federalism's umpires is of major importance
to a Quebec government concerned with encroachments on its
legislative jurisdiction (especially through the oblique vehicle of
Charter interpretation) and with the possibility of a declining role
in Canadian political institutions.
Yet another perceived threat to la survivance, a threat which
is of particular significance in periods of large government deficits,
is the loss of control over the agenda of social and economic
programmes which an essentially unrestricted federal spending power
implies. 29 The first aspect of this concern has only recently been
27 See supra, note 25, particulary the introductory essay by G.-A. Beaudoin.
28 I leave it to the reader to determine whether recent appointments to the Supreme
Court have evidenced the commitment of the federal government to ensuring respect for
these two preconditions.
29 Ironically one of the earliest critics of the federal spending power was Pierre Trudeau.
See P.E. Trudeau, "Federal Grants to Universities" in P.E. Trudeau, ed., Federalism and the
French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968) 79. For an interesting analysis of the
economic implications of the spending power and of the fiscal agenda of the current
government see T. Courchene, Forever Amber (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental
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perceived outside Quebec as the federal government attempts to
reduce its deficit by off-loading a greater share of the cost of
maintaining shared-cost programmes it essentially imposed on
provinces. The second aspect of the spending power, control over
the agenda of social programmes, has not attracted much attention
outside Quebec and indeed, in many parts of the country, federal
spending in such fields is seen in the opposite light. The federal
government ought to establish national standards for social
programmes and use its financial power to enforce these standards.
For Quebec, an unrestricted federal spending power has
meant that the central government was able to institute its own
programmes that neutralized provincial social initiatives at the same
time that they led to smaller unrestricted transfer payments.
Additionally, shared-cost programmes have been deployed even more
directly to set provincial social and fiscal priorities. The continuing
threat represented by the federal spending power is its capacity to
cripple provincial economic initiatives by committing (as in the cost
of legal aid, medical insurance, pensions, or day care) an inordinate
share of provincial revenues to federal priorities, or to federally
determined structures for achieving shared priorities. Compounding
this loss of control is the fact that the cost of all pan-Canadian tax
expenditures falls disproportionately on wealthier provinces. To the
degree that federal shared-cost programmes become linked with the
idea of equalization, then provinces not wishing to support such
programmes are double losers. Through cost-sharing they must
commit their own resources to federal priorities. At the same time
they are squeezed from the taxation field by the higher revenue
demands of national tax authorities who must finance the federal
contribution to these shared-cost programmes.30
Relations, Queen's University, 1990). See also, R. Boadway, J.M. Mintz & D.D. Purvis, '"he
Economic Policy Implications of the Meech Lake Accord' in KE. Swinton & CJ. Rogerson,
eds, Competing Constitutional V14ions: The Meech LakeAccord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 225.
30 For a sustained critique of the spending power along these lines see A. Petter,
"Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power" (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 448.
Petter also signals the important difference between equalization and shared-cost programmes,
noting that most of the political arguments against restricting the federal spending power are
misdirected - being in fact arguments in favour of equalization.
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Here also, it is not clear that the provisions of the Meech
Lake Accord successfully addressed the real economic threat posed
by the spending power. For what the federal government would not
have been able to achieve administratively through shared-cost
programmes, it could still have accomplished through other tax
expenditures such as income tax rebates and deductions (along the
lines of the Canadian Home Insulation Programme), or through
direct transfers to individuals (along the lines of the Family
Allowance scheme), or even through declarations under section
92(10)(c), Crown Corporations and like vehicles. It also bears
notice that existing constitutional conventions as well as the
extensive deficit are such that the occasions for unilateral federal
dirigisme in fields of provincial jurisdiction are probably limited, by
contrast with the virtually unrestricted federal power of tax
expenditure or direct payments. The symbolic threat for several
provincial politicians in Quebec seems rather to be the possibility of
creating too many programmes partly bearing the Maple Leaf flag
in fields of exclusive provincial legislative jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
without at least some notion of cost-sharing flexibility and
restrictions on federal spending in provincial fields, the Caisse de
d~p6t et de placementsl would not have been established and the
economic benefits it has produced for Quebec never realized. The
example of the Caisse illustrates that there can be a positive side to
opting out and that a major part of the concern in Quebec relating
to federal agenda-setting through the spending power is the
opportunity-cost it entails.3 2
31 For an assessment of the performance of the Caisse see S. Brooks & A. Tanguay,
"Qudbec's Caisse de d~p6t et placement: tool of nationalism?" (1985) 28 Can. Pub. Admin.
99, who argue that it has been a remarkable success, and has not been deployed as a tool of
Quebec nationalism. Many commentators, such as the above authors also suggest that the
Canada Pension Plan would be in much better shape today if it had been organized along the
lines of the Caisse.
32 Several opportunity-cost examples come to mind: (i) the different priorities of
Quebec's Fonds de recherche et de l'aide A la recherche and the federal government's SSHRC,
NSERC, and MRC; (ii) the different schemes for delivering Legal Aid and Medicare in
Quebec, which do not always fit well with federal presumptions; and (iii) Quebee's inability
to get the federal government to adjust its income tax rebates to reflect provincial investment
priorities as shown in the Quebec Stock Savings Plan.
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The final perceived threat to the agenda of la survivance
which the substantive provisions of the Meech Lake Accord were
designed to palliate, is typified in the so-called "scandal of the
midnight deal" of 1982. This event confirmed Quebec's worst fears
about being excluded from crucial constitutional decisions and drove
home perceptions of the provincial government's political
disempowerment. A revised amending formula which responds to
Quebec's desire to gain a veto over constitutional amendments
relating not only to the division of powers but also to changes to
major pan-Canadian political institutions and to structures of
federalism therefore came to be perceived as essential. The object
of an extended veto power in this second sense would be to control
changes to the federal features of the Constitution. These include
the principle of proportionate representation in the House of
Commons, the composition and powers of, and method of selection
for the Senate, the Supreme Court, and the evolution towards
provincial status of the federal territories. Each of these features of
the Constitution bear directly on Quebec's traditional concern about
protecting its role in Canadian political institutions.33
Yet this interest of the Quebec government - the key
institutional player at Meech Lake defending French language and
culture - was transformed by other provinces into an issue of
straight provincial power through a revised amending formula
grounded in the unanimity principle. More than any other feature
of the constitutional amendment process, this shows how the fact of
the Quebec government coming to embody one party to the
Confederation compact has led, under the 1982 formulae, to a
reconception of the compact as a "state's rights" motif. Tragically,
as the reluctance of at least two provinces to endorse the Meech
Lake Accord reveals, a unanimity rule can often lead to
constitutional consequences directly contrary to Quebec's interests.
In the negotiations leading to the Meech Lake Accord, Quebec's
33 It is true, of course, that in the April Accord of premiers (April 1981), the l.-vesque
government appeared ready to give up the veto which had always been claimed by Quebec
governments to that point. This was probably a strategic error since it later paved the way
for the agreement between all the other provinces which excluded Quebec later that year.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the conditions under which Quebec appeared prepared
to surrender its veto claim were so narrow that, had the other provinces respected its terms,
the "midnight deal" would never have been negotiated.
498 [voL- 29 No. 3
...Meech Lake (Part II)
interests could have been accommodated by readjusting the 7/50 per
cent formula currently in place for the various contentious matters
in section 42 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to a 7/75 per cent
formula, or even by giving Quebec a special power to veto certain
categories of amendment. What is clear in the current context,
however, is that the concept of a Quebec veto over proposed
amendments to the constitution addresses legitimate concerns about
the possibility that, on some key issues which may not even directly
deal with language and culture, the provinces will divide not by
region, not by size, not by the nature of their economies, but by the
language of their majority. The symbolism of a veto, then, even if
it would have to be shared, in certain cases, with other provinces,
cannot be discounted as a key feature of Quebec's constitutional
agenda.
These four issues, then, are the political concerns which were
at the root of the Mont Gabriel declaration and which subsequently,
formed the basis of Quebec's constitutional reform agenda pursued
at the Meech Lake and Langevin Block negotiations. As reflecting
threats to la survivance, they can be reduced to a single substantive
theme with two variations. The theme is that the cultural and
linguistic specificity of Quebec makes it a province unlike the others,
regardless of its relative share of the Canadian population. The
variations are, first, that this distinctiveness requires special
accommodation of its jurisdictional claims in relation to population
policy and finances; and second, that this distinctiveness demands
special accommodation of its interests in federal institutions and
processes, including processes of constitutional amendment. Given
the political climate in Quebec since 1960 and Trudeau's promise
of renewed federalism in the referendum debate of 1980, these were
not only important substantive goals, they were highly charged
political symbols.34
But, however important these items may be symbolically, and
however necessary it may have been to enact them as constitutional
amendments rather than deal with them through political
34 One of the best short statements of the various symbolic dimensions of the Meech
Lake Accord process can be found in Monahan, After Meech Lake, supra, note 5 at 14-19. See
also, P. Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1991).
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accommodation, they do not effectively address the main threats to
the survival of French language and culture in Canada. For, despite
the impression given by ill-tempered comments of certain groups in
Ontario and Western Canada, the most pressing threats to
Francophone culture do not come from any particular constitutional
arrangements now existing in Canada, or from the unilateral action
of the federal government. Rather the principal threats to la
survivance are, on the one hand, internal (or psychic), and on the
other hand, largely external to Canada, and are grounded in the
global economy3 5 Surprisingly, with the possible exception of the
more general "distinct society" clause - which might conceivably have
been deployed to support a political claim by Quebec for shared
jurisdiction or at least special input into co-operative agreements -
the Meech Lake Accord did not speak to many of those matters of
federal jurisdiction, especially in connection with economic policy,
which would be most important to generating a confidence among
French-speaking Quebeckers about la survivance.36 It is important,
therefore, to recognize the important symbolism of the Meech Lake
Accord, yet acknowledge that it would have been only a part of the
required political response to the agenda of la survivance. Just as
the Constitution Ac4 1867 was not the final word on issues of
French/English relations across Canada - of interprovincial affairs,
and of federal/provincial jurisdiction as it relates to Quebec -
neither could have been the Meech Lake Accord.
So much for this sketch of the Meech Lake Accord as a
response to the motif of survival. Similar, and more cogent, points
can be made about the reality of many of the threats to which Bill
101 (La Charte de la langue frangaise) and Bill 178 appear to be
addressed. Even less than current constitutional arrangements and
legislative actions of the federal government can it be said that the
35What are identified here as internal, or psychic, threats are concerns relating to self-
perception and self-confidence: to the sense of commitment to a common project. They will
be examined in greater detail in the next two sections of this essay.
36 The kinds of jurisdictional transfers which, ultimately, came to be perceived as
necessary once Quebec federalists lost confidence in their ability to wield any influence in the
federal arena, are those listed in the Allaire Report. See Liberal Party of Canada (Quebec),
Un Qubec Libre de Ses Choir (Allaire Report) (Quebec: Liberal Party, 28 January 1991)
[hereinafter Allaire Report].
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day-to-day activities of ordinary English-speaking Quebeckers directly
threaten the French language or culture. Yet, several aspects of Bill
101 seem to confuse largely external and economic threats with the
ordinary routine of private individuals. Some of these merit explicit
mention, if only for illustrative purposes.
The small shopkeeper who displays English commercial signs
to an overwhelmingly English-speaking clientele in a largely English-
speaking neighbourhood in western Montreal (in contravention of
section 58 of the Charte de la langue fran~aise) is not a threat to
the survival of French culture. But Johnny Carson, American
movies, major league baseball, and the National Football League
certainly are. Bluntly put, the affection of French-speaking Quebec
for the products of the us cultural industry is one of the major
challenges to the flourishing of indigenous culture.3 7  Once again,
the elderly couple who wishes to receive in English the government
social services for which they have largely paid is not a threat to the
delivery in French of Quebec's social programmes. But the culture
of McDonald's hamburgers, the preference for imported consumer
goods, and a branch-plant economy designed to serve the North
American market are. In a word, the foreign technological
dominance of key aspects of Quebec's economy, especially since so
much of this technology is packaged for export in English, poses a
palpable challenge to the attempt to maintain a viable French-
language technology. Finally, the young, Francophone, upwardly
mobile parents wishing to educate their children in English schools
so as to gain an advantage on those who are learning English as a
second language in Quebec are not directly an assimilationist threat.
But inferior primary and secondary education in French, the
devastation of Quebec universities through significant underfunding,
and the substitution of post-secondary educational quantity for
37 Interestingly, sections 51-71 of the Charte de la langue frangaise implicitly recognize
this by their attempted prohibition of movies in English unless French-language versions are
also available, by their attempt to require that French-language versions of games and toys be
available, and so on. But the difficulty of controlling culture itself (be this high culture or low
culture) means that the prohibitions can realistically only touch "permanent" media: print,
film, videotape, and so on. For similar observations made in the context of English-language
Canadian culture, see the sources cited, supra, note 7. The Canadian content regulations of
the CRTC and the Income Tax Act prescriptions in respect of advertising in "foreign"
periodicals are of the same piece as sections 51-71 of the Charte de la langue frangaise.
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quality are. That is, the continental economy as promoted by the
Autopact, hydroelectric exports, the Free Trade Agreement, and
various other economic policies, including their rhetorical
underpinnings, are what primarily drives the anglicization of
immigrants and the entrepreneurial classes.
The citation of these counter-examples to a number of the
ambitions of the Charte de la langue frangaise should not be taken
as an argument that it is fatally flawed. Many of its provisions
relating to the language of the work place in large enterprises
(sections 41-50), to the educational obligations of non-Francophone
immigrants (sections 72-88), to the language requirements placed on
those holding a professional qualification (section 35), to restrictions
on the merchandising of movies, toys, and games where French-
language versions are unavailable (section 54), and even to the
language of outdoor commercial signs and advertising (section 58),
can be explained and justified as being genuinely directed to the
political agenda of la survivance. But Bill 101's symbolism also has
a negative and repressive undertone which, in many places, seems
purely spiteful. In these respects, the Honourable Dr. Camille
Laurin's psychiatric prescription has a hidden "double-whammy" for
the survival of the French language and culture3 8 It desensitizes
one to real threats, and it equates the cultural flourishing of the
majority with the cultural repression of the local minority. In other
words, the legislative cure of Bill 101 is sold as being virtually
painless and cost-free: you do not have to assume personal
responsibility for your language and culture because the government
is taking all necessary steps. Moreover, it would seem that certain
aspects of Bills 101 and 178 are designed less to promote the
French language and culture in Quebec than to rewrite history by
denying that the English-speaking community was one of Quebec's
founding European peoples. 9 This denial of its minority's role in
fashioning a modem Quebec, as much as the denial by certain
English-rights extremists of Canada's French-language minority's role
38 See C. Laurin, Lefrangais langue du Qudbec (Montreal: P-ditions du Jour, 1977) for
a collection of the Minister's speeches between May and October 1977 which clearly show this
undertone of intolerance.
39 See, for example, ibid., at 123-140.
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in fashioning a modem Canada, is tragic in the eyes of those who
celebrate heterogeneity and cultural diversity. 40
Notwithstanding the concerns expressed in the last two
paragraphs, any realistic assessment of the situation of the French
language and culture in Canada would acknowledge that it is under
threat. Similarly, any realistic assessment would lead to the
conclusion that, to palliate this threat, various legislative measures
directed to Canada's majority language and its cultural products
might well be necessary. Even though it is doubtful either that the
Meech Lake Accord did, or that some of the more restrictive aspects
of Bills 101 and 178 as directed to private individuals do, adequately
address the most pressing threats to la survivance, their important
symbolic value for Quebec political elites and for French-speaking
Quebeckers generally must be conceded. This symbolism - of
recognition and validation - was a presumptive reason for not
rejecting initiatives such as the Meech Lake Accord outright. It is
now also a reason, in the case of the more misdirected aspects of
Bills 101 and 178, for responding to them not with the arbitrary
"NO" of law and guaranteed constitutional rights, but with a dialogue
encompassing both form and substance.
I hold this view (along with a large number of my fellow
English-speaking Quebeckers), for several reasons - some emotional,
some perhaps, more rational. The most important of these reasons
flow from an acceptance of the following pragmatic assertion
advanced by those Francophones who are federalists but who are
not unsympathetic to Bill 101 and who supported the Meech Lake
Accord. The assertion is that without a vibrant Francophone
element to Canada's self-definition, the country is doomed as an
independent political state; and without a dynamic Francophone
society in Quebec, all Canadian Francophones are doomed. The
first half of this assertion will be developed in detail later in this
essay. The second bears some expansion here. While the
contributions of Franco-Ontarians, Franco-Manitobans, Acadians,
and other Francophone groups outside Quebec to the survival of the
French language and culture in North America should not be
40 For a recent plea for recognition of the contribution of Quebee's English-speaking
community to the flourishing of the province see R. Scowen, A Different ision: The English
in Quebec in the 1990s (Don Mills, Ont.: Maxwell Macmillan, 1990).
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minimized, there are several indicia of the vital role played by
French-speaking Quebeckers and French-language institutions
centred in Quebec. Why is it that the F6deration des francophones
hors Quebec sometimes complains that Radio-Canada is really only
Radio-Montr6al? How often do non-Quebec Francophones win
Governor-General's culture awards (by comparison with those won
by Anglophone Quebeckers)? What is the relative wealth and
standing of l'Universit6 Laval and l'Universit6 de Montr6al, for
example, by contrast with the Universit6 de Moncton, l'Universit6
Laurentienne, le College St.-Boniface, or l'Universit6 St.-Paul? In
the fields of art, music, dance, film, theatre, and even hockey, one
sees that the contributions of Francophones in Quebec (and more
particularly in Montreal) are central to the flourishing of the
French-language cultural industry in North America.
Given the relationship between the particulars of the Meech
Lake Accord and Bills 101 and 178 to perceptions and
misperceptions of the socio-economic threats to la survivance, it is
important to assess the implications of these responses for English-
speaking Quebeckers over the next few decades. Is there a way in
which their presence in Quebec can come to be perceived by
French-speaking Quebeckers as a positive contribution towards,
rather than as a threat to, la survivance? How can they come to be
valued within the new Quebec without being forced to themselves
assimilate? The parallels between the survival agenda of English-
speaking Quebeckers and French-speaking Canadians at times can
be striking. While much of the onus must be on French-speaking
Quebeckers of good will to stand up to their more xenophobic
compatriots and to respond positively to the overtures of Quebec's
linguistic minority, the initial moves must still rest with the English-
speaking community itself. In arguing passionately, but vainly, for
ratification of the Meech Lake Accord, a first step was taken by
many. Now, at this critical juncture in Canada's constitutional
debates, there are at least four facets to the role which should be
played by English-speaking Quebeckers - each of which reflects a
different aspect of the changed socio-economic context in Quebec
since the early 1960s, and the changed political context of the 1980s.
A first and most important response to the challenge of la
survivance demands an effort to modernize the rhetoric of Quebec
and Canadian politics. It is hard to accommodate oneself to the
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new Quebec, as many have attempted, when political discourse is
still dominated by outdated, unfair, and hyper-nationalist stereotypes
such as 'best treated minority," "insensitivity to the future agenda,"
and "linguistic ghettos." To illustrate the misapprehension sometimes
consciously promoted by professional xenophobes and their
occasional allies in the mass media, it is worth citing some examples
of the reality of English-speaking Quebec today - a reality which
gives positive lie to the racist stereotypes which, even in the 1950s,
were of dubious accuracy. The City of Westmount, that supposed
ghetto populated with people characterized by Keith Spicer as
"Rhodesians," is now thirty per cent Francophone. Roslyn Public
School in that City - long the flagship elementary school of the
entire Protestant educational system - recently proposed the phasing
out of its English stream, thereafter to offer only a French-
immersion programme. McGill University, the caricatured elite
institution for English-speaking Quebeckers, enrols a large number
of Francophones (over eighty per cent in agriculture and about
twenty per cent overall) and is active in many joint research
ventures with French-language universities; in its Faculty of Law,
moreover, about one-quarter of the syllabus is taught in French,
even by English-speaking professors. Most younger Anglophones in
Quebec read at least one French-language newspaper, frequently
watch programmes on Radio-Canada or T616m6dia, and regularly go
to French-language theatre and other cultural "spectacles."
Yet this new reality, quite at odds with traditional
nationalistic dogma, is largely unknown in Francophone circles. To
permit government policy to be dictated by the small minority who,
for political reasons, conflate (1) the attitude of the ill-informed
outside Quebec and (2) the posturing of those very few Quebec
Anglophones nostalgic for the splendid isolation and governmental
minimalism of the "two solitudes" with the viewpoint of most
English-speaking Quebeckers is tragic. Sadly, as personal experience
in dealings with a number of civil servants at the assistant deputy
ministerial level and with ministerial policy advisers (not to mention
with one or two members of the section 96 judiciary) attests, these
stereotypes still have a powerful hold in the provincial capital. To
overcome them, English-speaking Quebeckers can no longer pursue
their traditional policy of institutional parallelism. Relics of the
prior modus vivendi such as the "English-speaking Bar of Montreal"
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should be quietly abandoned. Stereotyping is most often a function
of ignorance rather than malice; and institutional parallelism - in the
arts, the professions, and business - facilitates ignorance rather than
understanding.
A second task of English-speaking Quebeckers will be to
assist all Quebeckers to appreciate where the true threats to French
language and culture lie. It is a constant source of amazement that
even the well-educated often see - perhaps for reasons of
scapegoating - those English-speaking Quebeckers who founded
(and funded) la Biblioth~que de Montr6al, l'Orchestre symphonique
de Montr6al, le Mus6e des Beaux-Arts, le Th6atre du Rideau-Vert,
Centraide, l'Association montr6alaise des aveugles, and so on, as
being opposed to the promotion of French culture and social
services. It was the opening to Francophones of these initially
English-language secular institutions, especially in Montreal, that
helped to fill the vacuum produced with the collapse of the social
role of the Roman Catholic Church in the 1960s. Notwithstanding
certain misapprehensions of the French-speaking elite, it is through
continued active participation in these cultural endeavours that
English-speaking Quebeckers can ensure that the lessons of the past
will not be forgotten.
It follows that, far from devoting political energy to the rabid
defence of their own acquired rights, English-speaking politicians in
Quebec need to help their Francophone associates to formulate
effective socio-cultural policies in Quebec City and in Ottawa to
promote "la francophonie." Examples of those who have done so in
the recent past would include Eric Kierans who contributed mightily
to the design of the Caisse de ddp6t et de placement, Robert Shaw
who was general manager of Expo 67, Phyllis Lambert who founded
H6ritage Montr6al and who organized and funded the Centre
canadien de l'architecture, and the Molsons and the Bronfmans
whose financial resources have helped to maintain Montreal's
identity as a "major league" city. To show how support in the
English-speaking community can be marshalled to promote the
French language and culture not only within Quebec, but across
North America, is a formidable but necessary challenge in the years
ahead.
Third, it will be necessary for Quebec's English-speaking
population to develop a better conception of its own long-term
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interests. This is no more urgent than in relation to its expenditure
of political capital. Certainly, in the abstract, the Charter rights to
freedom of expression, due process, and so on, are those usually
associated with constitutional government in the liberal state, and
with pluralism. But linguistic minorities are always poorly placed to
defend such interests in the political arena, as Riel in 1870 and
1885, Laurier in 1917, and Camilien Houde in 1942 each discovered.
Until French-speaking civil libertarians in Quebec are willing to
tackle the theoretical conflict between majoritarianism and certain
"fundamental freedoms" - a conflict which flows from the political
agenda of la survivance - there is little good to be accomplished by
responding to this conflict in such a way as to create in the minds
of most people (who often do not appreciate the legal implications
of political pluralism) a direct association between civil liberties and
"anglo-rights." Rather, as Pierre Trudeau saw in the 1950s and early
1960s, it is a political culture of tolerance which must precede any
particular constitutional expression of its consequences. 41 In the
present context it is the defence of the rights of others - visible
minorities, the handicapped, women, prisoners, the poor, victims of
family violence, Native Canadians - and not the advancing of
language claims per se which must serve as the immediate vehicle by
which English-speaking Quebeckers can promote a more universal
culture of diversity and pluralism in the province.
There is a further point about long-term interest which needs
to be made to those "rights claimants" who seek to invoke the
Charter on behalf of all English-speaking Quebeckers. On any
realistic scale of valuation it is hard to conceive the language of
outdoor commercial signs - the target of the vilified Bill 178 - as
involving crucial expression. The role of English-speaking
Quebeckers as a community is neither to don the mantle of civil
libertarian virtue in defence of their own interests, nor to lecture
the government of Quebec through indiscriminate discourse such as
"a right is a right is a right." On the contrary, it is to distinguish
between public and symbolic negative liberties and private and
substantive positive, or dignitary, liberties. The preservation and
41 See P.E. Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec" in Trudeau, ed., supra,
note 29 at 103.
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enhancement of governmental and social services, educational and
cultural institutions are where the real long-term interest of English-
speaking Quebeckers lies. It is also an important legal terrain where
conflicts with those French-speaking political liberals who do believe
in abstract rights - except where these relate to English rights which
are believed to threaten French symbols - can be avoided.
Unfortunately, the message now emanating from many quarters in
English-speaking Quebec is one of victimization and unfairness, a
message hardly guaranteed to build bridges of linguistic tolerance in
the rest of the country. This message also carries the implication
that the government of Quebec is not to be trusted, either with
greater influence in the Canadian federal political arena, or with the
symbol of characterizing its territorial constituency as a "distinct
society."
A fourth challenge confronting English-speaking Quebec
relates to its relationship to the rest of Canada. The challenge is
to play an effective role in educating all Canadians to the particular
circumstances of the country's French-speaking population, both
within Quebec and elsewhere, and to help educate Quebec about
the rest of Canada. Most importantly, it is necessary to show how
legislative responses like Bill 178, while untimely, unfortunate, and
perhaps even petty, are nonetheless grounded in perceptions of
economic and political circumstance. Without this effort by English-
speaking Quebeckers it is entirely foreseeable that political elites
and ordinary citizens in the rest of the country may conclude that
the political will to continue to build a Canada in which French-
speaking and English-speaking communities can coexist is no longer
present in Quebec - with the consequence that they will simply tell
Quebec to go it alone. Moreover, without this effort, it is likely
that these elites will consciously neglect the aspirations of French-
speaking Canadians outside Quebec, and postpone responding to the
legitimate claims of their own linguistic minorities. Put bluntly, how
can the more extremist leaders of the English-speaking community
in Quebec claim that the symbolism of Bill 101 is misdirected
because it does not address positive socio-economic questions, when
their own political agenda is driven by the very same misdirection?
As Premier Bourassa rightly perceives, in the wake of Bill
178 and the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, neither he nor Mr.
Remillard can carry Quebec's message to the rest of Canada with
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any credibility, not even by resorting to "sabre-rattling" demands such
as those set out in the Allaire Report. While other premiers have
a major role to play through the accommodation of French-speaking
minorities in their provinces and through their statement of a
positive vision of linguistic tolerance for the country, fundamentally
it is English-speaking Quebec and its political leaders who have
become the psychic linchpin of Canada's future.4 2 The overall
weakness of its Cabinet presence in Ottawa in recent years has
deprived the country of valuable political input. Further, the
inability of English-speaking ministers in the Quebec Cabinet to help
shape the position of the Quebec Liberal Party and' to craft the
details both of the Meech Lake proposal and the policy process
leading to the province's follow-up position has had most
unfortunate consequences. The estrangement produced by the
invocation in 1988 of the override in Bill 178 and reflected in the
election of four Equality Party candidates to the National Assembly
in 1989 suggests that this fourth contribution of English-speaking
Quebeckers may prove the most difficult to realize.
Mistrust between linguistic communities is easily generated;
trust is long in the nurturing. On this particular issue, the policy
implications of the motif of la survivance, politics is the art of
nurturing trust through candour and moderation. The failure of
Anglophones and Francophones in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada
to listen to each other's truth has led politicians to tell their own
truths only to each group. Such a strategy is guaranteed to generate
policy distortions and feelings of betrayal when the inevitable
political compromise, which is translated into legislation, reveals the
presence of another truth to which one has not previously been
exposed. French-speaking Quebeckers need to hear from their own
leaders the truths about the real threats to their language and
42 In claiming that the English-speaking minority in Quebec is a psychic linchpin, I do
not mean to say that its voice is more important than that of others. The claim is rather
that the reaction of this community to initiatives of the government in Quebec City has an
important influence on how these initiatives are viewed elsewhere in Canada. If English-
speaking Quebec carries on like an oppressed minority, then it is only understandable how
public opinion elsewhere will reflect a negative view of the province's politicians. If English-
speaking Quebec, by contrast, seeks to explain the socio-economic context which induced
Quebec to take certain political decisions viewed with suspicion in other parts of the country,
then the chances for maintaining an interprovincial dialogue are enhanced.
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culture, and the costs which pseudo-solutions impose on themselves
as well as on others. They also need to hear from these same
leaders, different truths about xenophobia, multiculturalism, and a
constitutional culture of tolerance. English-speaking Canadians
outside Quebec need to hear, again from their own leaders, the
truths about assimilation and distinctiveness, and about the costs
which their indifference imposes on themselves as well as on others.
They also need to hear contrasting truths about the premises upon
which the country was founded, about its constitutional history, and
about the enrichment which a politics of bilingualism provides.
French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec need to hear the truths
about the constraints which their qualified support of the repressive
elements in the language policies of the Quebec government impose
on a federal government at last coming to recognize its historic
responsibility for protecting their interests in the maintenance of the
Confederation compromise. Finally, English-speaking Quebeckers
need to hear (and not merely listen to) the truths about the costs
which their self-indulgent carping impose; they also need to hear
truths about the positive contributions they can make to
contemporary Quebec society and, through it, to Canada's future.
If English-speaking Quebeckers in particular can come to see this
opportunity, they will be able to contribute to all Quebeckers and all
Canadians hearing a truth other than their own, and will help to
ensure that the overtones of defensiveness surrounding la survivance
stand a chance of becoming a harmonics of openness about
l'panouissement as one of Canada's primary constitutional motifs.43
In focusing on this aspect of the constitutional challenge confronting the country, I
do not mean to imply that other policy issues which have little to do with language, culture,
or governmental organization are unimportant. In the concluding section of this essay, I
address the relationship of constitutional renovation to concerns such as citizen empowerment,
poverty, violence, the environment, and anomie consequent upon our inadequate responses to
industrialization. Perhaps because I am not a constitutional lawyer, I believe that responses
to these issues really do have an important constitutional dimension. For the opposite
opinion, however, see Monahan, supra, note 5 at 37-8.
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V. THE MEANING OF MEECH LAKE:
CONSTITUTIONAL SYMBOLS
In the previous section it has been argued that the motif of
la survivance powerfully lay behind the six constitutional proposals
of the Quebec government and dominated debate about the Meech
Lake Accord in Quebec. Indeed, it is the recognition of the
seriousness and complexity of the various threats to French language
and culture in Canada (and not a general hostility to the political
agenda of recent Quebec governments) that motivated the
juxtaposition of the Meech Lake Accord and the invocation of the
"notwithstanding clause" in Bill 178 in the title of this essay. For
both the Meech Lake Accord and Bill 178, while constitutionally
independent of each other, are politically quite closely linked
through the theme la survivance. In the next section of this essay,
the relationship of the "override clause" of Bill 178 to the "distinct
society" clause of the Meech Lake Accord will be explored in detail.
For the moment, however, it is important to reflect on how the
Meech Lake Accord came to be perceived in Quebec, and why. In
other words, it is necessary, in complete abstraction of any of its
particulars, to assess the Meech Lake Accord as a constitutional
symbol for Quebeckers and, in consequence, for Canadians. To
appreciate current Canadian constitutional politics, one must first
attempt to unpack the symbolism of the Meech Lake Accord as a
whole, and work through how it came to acquire the symbolic
weight that it did.
The Meech Lake Accord was generally perceived in Quebec,
through its distinct society clause, as legitimating the claim that
Quebec was the homeland of French-Canadians and as legitimating
the efforts of the provincial government to promote the French
language.44 Hence the explanation of Premier Bourassa's constitu-
44 The literature on this topic in Quebec is extensive. For representative samples, see
I. Bernier, "Meech Lake and Constitutional Visions" in Swinton & Rogerson, eds, supra, note
29 at 239; P. Blache & J. Woehrling, L'Accord Meech-Langevin et les competences linguistiques
du Quebec, Quebec, Conseil de la langue frangaise, 1988, Document No. 68; and J. Woehrling,
'La modification constitutionnelle de 1987, la reconnaissance du Qudbec comme socitd
distincte et la dualitd linguistique du Canada" (1988) 29 C. de D. 3. See also G. Bergeron,
Pratique de l'Etat au Quebec (Montreal: Quebec/America, 1984) at 173ff.
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tionally dubious claim, that he would not have needed to invoke the
notwithstanding clause of the Charter to sustain Bill 178 were the
"distinct society" clause of the Meech Lake Accord in place. No
doubt, the "distinct society" clause was itself a type of notwith-
standing clause, although not of the pre-emptive force of section 33.
It was, rather, an interpretative injunction much like section 27 of
the Charter. In this guise it would have ultimately had a bearing on
the section 1 calculus undertaken by courts. For this reason - while
invoking the "distinct society" clause as a justification for Charter-
offensive legislation could be seen to have had the disadvantage of
producing less shock value and, therefore, less political outrage than
invoking the section 33 override - it would have had the advantage
of engaging a dialectic of reasonableness, proportionality, and
rationality, rather than fiat. Even though it is doubtful that the
actual terms of Bill 178 would survive Charter scrutiny on the basis
of the "distinct society" clause, it is clear that in the eyes of the
government of Quebec at least, the clause was consonant with, and
more or less sufficient to enable it to discharge legislatively, its
special responsibilities to French-speaking Canadians without having
systematically to invoke the section 33 override.45
The Meech Lake Accord was also seen by political elites in
Quebec as an attempt to restore a balance in Canadian
constitutionalism which was disrupted by the processes leading up
to, and by the political purposes of, the Charter. That balance was
the recognition in the Constitution Act, 1867 of the concepts of
society, of two founding peoples, and of linguistic minorities (both
French and English) as major themes in constitutional politics.46
45
This point bears some elaboration. In the Bill 101 case, which provoked Bill 178
(Ford v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford]), the Supreme Court left open
the possibility that a statute mandating the use of French on outdoor commercial signs and
restricting the relative size of information provided in other languages would have been
Charter-inoffensive. Hence, the invitation, through section 1 analysis, to the Quebec
government to proceed otherwise than by invoking section 33. Were the "distinct society"
clause in place, a similar (and perhaps more generous invitation) would presumably also have
been issued.
46 For a careful examination of this theme, written long before the Meech Lake Accord
was even negotiated, see C. Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation
in Late Twentieth Century Canada" [hereinafter Alternative Futures] in A.C. Cairns & C.
Williams, eds, Constitutionalisrn, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) 183 at 216.
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These elites did not claim (as revisionist nationalist discourse now
has it) that the Charter and the Constitution Act 1982 which gave
rise to it were an unmitigated error. Indeed, some politicians,
including Quebec's Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Gil
R6millard, even conceded that, taken as a whole, the constitutional
package of 1982 could be judged in a positive light. But the failure
of the Charter in particular to give adequate expression to the late
twentieth century aspirations of all French-speaking Canadians, and
the unseemly process by which it was engineered over the opposition
of the Quebec government have fatally compromised its status as a
constitutional symbol in that province. While Charter patriotism may
hold sway elsewhere in Canada, sadly, for the French-speaking
majority in Quebec, the patriation exercise now evokes not a spirit
of nationhood achieved but of nationhood betrayed.4 7 For this same
majority, the Charter does not now evoke a notion of the protection
of individual rights as much as it does the suppression of group
rights. Thus, for those who believe that the Constitution Act, 1982
ought to play a major role as a pan-Canadian constitutional symbol,
the Meech Lake Accord assumed an important place as an ex post
facto legitimating vehicle.
A third aspect of the symbolic function of the Meech Lake
Accord, also tied to the Charter, was the vindication which it seemed
to give of the view that group rights require as much constitutional
protection as individual rights. This perception is especially evident
in relation to how the override is viewed in Quebec. Because the
1982 political process came to be seen by many Quebeckers as
insensitive to the basic values of Canadian federalism, the specific
terms of the Canadian (as opposed to the Quebec) Charter never
entered popular consciousness as comprising constitutional
guarantees of legislative propriety. Hence, the Parti Qu6b6cois
government was able to deploy the section 33 override indiscrimi-
4 7 Again, it is interesting to note how the very word "nation" conveys the constitutional
ambiguity. For many non-French-speaking Canadians, the Canadian nation is identical to the
Canadian state. For many French-speaking Canadians, the state may be Canada, but the
nation is the French-speaking people. For a sense of this second use, see D. Johnson, Egalite
ou ind'pendence (Montrdal: Homme, 1965) at 123: "Canada ou Quebec, IA oil la nation
canadienne-frangaise trouvera Ia iibertd, IA sera sa patrie." A similar theme is traced in
Bergeron, supra, note 44 and in L. Balthazar, Bilan du nationalisrne au Qudbec (Montreal:
Hexagone, 1986).
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nately without the political cost which even a single invocation was
assumed by its proponents in the rest of Canada to entail. Indeed,
the deployment of the override in Bill 178 illustrates a central
paradox in the attitude of English-speaking Canadians towards the
Charter. Most Canadian political elites have already opted once, in
1982, explicitly for the concept of an override and by their failure to
remove it, since then, implicitly continue to opt for its maintenance.
Why, then, should its deployment in Quebec be viewed so negatively
(especially since 1987, when the systematic protest insertion of the
override was allowed to lapse)? It is one thing to have expected the
Quebec government to let the general override lapse in counterpart
to the constitutional rebalancing effected by the Meech Lake Accord.
It is quite another to suggest that the override should never be used
(as in Bill 178), especially when the protection of important majority
symbols such as the Charte de la langue frangaise is at stake. To say
that the negotiation of the Meech Lake Accord gave legitimacy in
Quebec to the 1982 patriation exercise and to the Charter is
accurate; but it must be remembered that this legitimacy also
includes the legitimacy of using section 33 for targeted purposes.4 8
Yet another reason why the symbolism of the Meech Lake
Accord was so powerful in Quebec lay in the fact that it was, like
the Charter, a constitutional document. During the ratification
debate, one often heard that it was not essential that the specific
terms of the Meech Lake Accord be given the status of constitutional
amendments because what really mattered (especially in connection
with the issues it actually treated) were the pragmatic accom-
modations associated with co-operative federalism. The argument
was as follows. If the practice of federalism is such that the Cullen-
Couture formula solves Quebec's immigration concern, that
consultation with the Attorney-General of Quebec does take place
on Supreme Court appointments, that there is a de facto opt-out
with compensation on all new shared-cost programmes, and that
48 No doubt the reaction of many in the rest of Canada to the Quebec government's
invocation of section 33 came as a surprise to Premier Bourassa, for he believed that his
government's decision to let the general override lapse in 1987 was a sign that his government
was committed, in exchange for the legitimation of Quebee's position in the Meech Lake
Accord, to accept the Consditution Act 1982. But to say that his government accepted the
1982 amendment package was not to say that it promised never to invoke section 33, which
after all, was a part of that package.
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after the exclusionary process by which the Constitution Ac4 1982
was proclaimed over its opposition, Quebec probably does have at
least a political veto on future constitutional amendments, why then
the desire for constitutionalization? Nevertheless, there were at
least five reasons why the Meech Lake Accord as a constitutional
vehicle was thought by the general population of Quebec and by the
Quebec government to be a necessary symbol. First, the Charter
precedent. If constitutionalization is as unimportant as is claimed,
why was the Charter constitutionalized? Second, the minority mind
set. However much practices develop and understandings are
nurtured, minorities and other disempowered groups typically feel
that getting constitutional recognition of their status is a needed
protection. Third, the federal argument. If Canada is truly a
federal state, why should these important political arrangements be
made subject to the sufferance of Ottawa? To constitutionalize in
this sense means to overcome, especially on issues of language and
culture, the psychological inferiority attaching to to the role of
supplicant (which had been Quebec's fate since 1867). Fourth, the
civilian legal mentality. Notions of constitutional convention, the
common law, and judicial law-making are closely linked with the
Anglo-Canadian legal tradition. To ask those trained in the civil law
to accept such informal processes on issues of fundamental concern
is analogous to asking an advocate trained in the common law to
accept blanket codification of the law of contracts and torts. The
uniform resistance of Supreme Court judges trained in civil law to
the notion of an "implied Bill of Rights" and the life-long crusade of
Pierre Trudeau to enact the Charter speak volumes to this point.
Fifth, the recognition argument. Practices, however settled and
however complete, are essentially discrete. They never demand an
explicit statement of underlying principle. To state the linguistic
duality of Canada and the special role of Quebec in Canada is to at
last achieve a recognition which would have made the Manitoba
Official Language Act, Ontario's Regulation 17, the imposition of
conscription in 1917, and the midnight deal of 1982 impossible. So
to resist the constitutionalization of the Meech Lake Accord by
advancing arguments about "pragmatics" and "practices" misses one
of the most important symbolic features which French-speaking
Quebeckers saw as attaching to it.
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A further facet of the symbolic meaning of the Meech Lake
Accord is tied to its role as a pan-Canadian (and not just a Quebec)
symbol. This facet also points up the short-sightedness of many
political leaders about the place of both official languages in
Canada. Few would deny that for two hundred years the French-
speaking population of Quebec has, in some measure, needed
Canada. As early as 1775, it was largely the British military which
repelled the American continental army seeking to make Quebec the
fourteenth colony. The fate of Louisiana attests to what the result
of any successful invasion would have been. Moreover, the weight
of the federal government in requiring, inter alia, bilingual
packaging, bilingual merchandising, and bilingual industrial standards
across the country has given the French language an economic clout
it would never have achieved with a population of less than six
million. Again, it is worth noting that the whole of Nouveau-
Quebec - the site of the James Bay Power developments - was
never part of New France, even in 1760; it was a part of the former
territory of Rupert's Land ceded to Canada after Confederation and
transferred to the province only in 1912. Finally, a separate French-
speaking Quebec would not have seen Montreal develop as the
major port for central Canada, as a railway centre, or as a
manufacturing centre, given its large English population. Indeed, it
is doubtful that Montreal would even have become a metropolis at
all under such circumstances. So the point can be made that for
two hundred years, what is now French-speaking Quebec has needed
Canada, even if today there is a plausibility to the claim that,
economically, it no longer does. From this confession of historic
need can be derived a counterpoint to hyper-nationalists who ignore
the 224 years between 1763 and 1987. To those French-speaking
political leaders in Quebec who systematically denigrate their
English-speaking community with epithets such as "best treated
minority," section 2(1) of the Meech Lake Accord - "the recognition
that the existence of .... English-speaking Canadians ... present in
Quebec, constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Canada" - was
an important reminder of their province's essential duality. It
served, as a complement to the "distinct society" clause, to symbolize
bilingualism in Quebec.
But, there has also been and, despite desperate attempts in
certain parts of the country to deny it, there still is a reciprocity in
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this need of each linguistic community for each other. English-
speaking Canada has also needed its French-speaking minority. In
1775 and 1812, the habitants contributed to the defence of the
territory. But more, the presence of a French-speaking minority
influenced government economic policy and helped produce political
arrangements which are now more sensitive to cultural and
community diversity. While it may be that the Tory refugees from
the American Revolution also brought with them organicist
tendencies, these were reinforced by Lower Canadian clericalism.
Today it is recognized that social organicism, now consecrated in
ideas such as multiculturalism, substantially contributes to defining
the country.49 The paradox, for those who claim that multicul-
turalism is necessarily the converse of bilingualism, is that, without
the social and political structure thrown up by bilingualism,
multiculturalism on the Canadian model would be impossible. It
follows that despite the current federal government's attempt to fix
the country in the us socio-economic orbit - with a bilateral, rather
than a multilateral, freer trade deal; by joining the Organization of
American States, by renewing the NORAD agreement at a time when
anti-Russian air defence is a relic of the 1950s - if the country is to
persist as a multicultural, constitutional democracy, with a rich
constitutional heritage, it will probably need a predominantly French-
speaking Quebec as one of its major components. Once again, the
Meech Lake Accord was a powerful symbol of this need. Section
2(1)(a) came to be seen in Quebec as an expression of the
institutional framework needed to maintain Canada's self-definitional
duality. In this sense, the Meech Lake Accord was understood as a
recognition by the rest of the country not only that Quebec was
different than other provinces, but that this difference was
treasured.50
49 The classical citation for this idea is G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and
Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation" (1966) 32 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 143. Its
implications for constitutional doctrine are traced in P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies"
(1988) 20 Ottawa L Rev. 117.
50 It is also worth noting that some now treasured Canadian symbols are a direct result
of having had to accommodate the aspirations of francophones. Who today would prefer the
Union Jack or the Red Ensign to our current flag? Or "God Save the Queen" to "0
Canada"? Or Royal Mail or Her Majesty's service? Only thirty years ago, these were said,
by no less than the Leader of the Official Opposition in Ottawa (and many votes), to be
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A seventh observation about the symbolic meaning of the
Meech Lake Accord also has a pan-Canadian dimension. As such,
it needs particular emphasis at this juncture in the country's
constitutional history. During the ratification debate, there
developed a myth that the Meech Lake Accord was flawed because
it was simply a Quebec deal. Those who took this position - for
example, the Premier of Newfoundland - argued that the Meech
Lake Accord should have been a comprehensive deal for all of
Canada. Two responses to this claim suggest themselves. The first
is that, whatever the initial intentions of the Premier of Quebec in
raising the five conditions for that province's political adherence to
the Constitution Ac4 1982, these conditions, as they were written in
the Meech Lake Accord, also made it a constitutional amendment
exercise valuable for all of Canada. This was true quite
independently of those features of the agreement added at the
behest of other premiers. This point will be considered more fully
below. The second response is that the Meech Lake Accord could
have best been an amendment valuable for all of Canada by being
an exercise conceived primarily with Quebec in view. That is, the
Meech Lake Accord should have been the Quebec round. Why else
was the 1987 constitutional reform process put together? As
illustrated earlier, the Meech Lake Accord was, at least in some
measure, intended to .be the "compact" complement to the 1982
constitutional round - a round dominated by concerns reflected in
the "statute" theory of the Constitution Act, 1867. That
constitutional renewal should occur in two or more stages is hardly
surprising. The fundamental allocative elements in the Canadian
Constitution, and indeed the Constitution itself, have never been
seen as a one-shot deal, mythologized as being essentially good for
ever and ever, as the American Constitution has been seen.51
unpatriotic and evidence that the French were taking over the country.
51 It bears note that, despite the mythology of the U.S. Constitution being unchanged
since 1789, it has undergone at least five reconstructive amendments since then: the first ten
amendments, the twelfth amendment, the thirteenth through fifteenth amendments, the
seventeenth amendment, and the twenty-second amendment. Moreover, the so-called U.S. Bill
of Rights - the first ten amendments - constituted a parallel accord to the initial Constitution
in that they were adopted by virtue of a promise made upon ratification of the federal
Constitution of 1789.
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Constitutional readjustment - implying the achievement of
responsible government, the reallocation of powers between orders
of government, the breaking of colonial bonds, and the
reconstruction of the basic values and institutions of the polity - is
a permanent feature of non-revolutionary societies. Canada has had
its share of such adjustments, typically, although, not always
proceeding in pairs.52
To characterize the 1987 Meech Lake Accord as not being
for all of Canada, and to have scuttled it on the basis that it was
not perfect, or that it was partial and incomplete, or that it ignored
the legitimate claims of the territories, or that it failed to address
the rights of Aboriginal peoples, of women, and of visible minorities,
or that it was oblivious to the multicultural agenda is to
misunderstand profoundly the dynamic of Canadian constitutional
reform5 3 No constitutional document since 1763, up to and
including the imperfect and incomplete Charter, has ever addressed
"all the issues". Given Canada's constitutional past, the only issue
ought to have been the following: on the basis of its limited
intentions - to accommodate within the traditional framework of
Canadian constitutionalism Quebec's special concerns, and, in
particular, to redress an imbalance in Canadian constitutionalism
brought about by the 1982 process - was the agreement a
reasonable one, which would have advanced the iteration of the
country's self-understanding? To the extent that the Meech Lake
Accord achieved this objective it was an amendment which served all
of Canada and, as such, could have been understood as an important
pan-Canadian symbol.
The symbolic meaning of the Meech Lake Accord in Quebec
was also conditioned by incredulity in the province that opponents
did not appreciate the myriad ways in which the agreement was not
just directed to Quebec's concerns. Most of the specific legal and
constitutional objections to the Meech Lake Accord actually had little
52 These have been, as noted in the first part of this essay, those Imperial statutes and
proclamations of 1763, 1774, 1791, 1840, 1867, 1905, 1927, 1931, 1947, 1949, 1965, 1982, and
the failed effort of 1987. As will be argued later, there is a striking parallelism in the pairings
of 1774 and 1791; 1840 and 1867; and 1982 and 1987, the most important of the ,arious
listed Imperial statutes.
53 A similar point is made by Monahan, supra, note 5 at 20.
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to do with its being a "sell-out" to Quebec's constitutional demands.
Indeed, as many as five of the six points in the Meech Lake Accord
to which objection was taken were only marginally relevant to the
agenda advanced by the Quebec government. What were these
points of objection for which Quebec was wrongly being held
accountable? To begin, the Senate proposal. But Quebec did not
seek Senate reform and could easily have lived with the present
system until a totally new arrangement was made. The second,
third, and fourth objections related to the presumed decentralization
of national power to the provinces in the immigration, Supreme
Court, and spending power amendments. Again, radical
decentralization was not Quebec's agenda, for it sought these various
forms of power sharing for itself alone, on the basis of arguments it
has made at least since the late 1940s and especially since Trudeau's
proposed formula in the June 1971 Victoria Charter.5 4 Moreover, on
each of these three items, a strong case can be made for Quebec
evincing a special concern. If no such case can be made for other
provinces, then the objecting provinces (who after all were at the
root of these generalizations) could simply have declined to exercise
the power they were given. In other words, the Meech Lake Accord
could have come to symbolize the constitutional maturity of
Canada's provinces through their ability to resist the temptation to
exercise political power simply because it was proffered.
This last point suggests at least two further, and positive,
observations to be made about the symbolism of the four jurisdic-
tional proposals set out in the Meech Lake Accord. On the one
hand, the consequences thought to be attendant on them, insofar as
relations between provinces are concerned, were misdirected. The
only one of these proposals having any significant interprovincial
effect - the restrictions on shared-cost programmes - would have
had little bearing on the financial viability of such programmes. To
claim otherwise misconceives both the unequal sources of federal
programme funding, and confuses equalization (or unconditional
54 For a discussion of the constitutional amendment process since the second World War
viewed from a Quebec perspective, see La Constitution du Canada, supra, note 23 at 233-
49. The best short summary of Quebec's objections to the Victoria Formula was offered by
Jacques-Yvan Morin. See J.-Y. Morin, "Modifier la Constitution ou momifier le Quebee" Le
Devoir [de MontrealJ (15 May 1971) 5.
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grants) with cost-sharing (or conditional grants).55 Even if a "rich"
province were to have opted out of a new cost-sharing programme,
the disproportionate federal share of general tax revenue drawn
from that province would still be available for redistribution to
poorer provinces, whether or not they joined the programme or
themselves opted out. On the other hand, the minor decen-
tralization in the Meech Lake Accord would itself have been a
constitutional gain. It would have reversed the magnetic forces of
the federal government by creating a model of what has been called
intra-state federalism, in which each province gains a larger input
into national political institutions5 6  Further, the cost-sharing
provision would have enhanced the ability of each province to
pursue its own policy course without the incentive of federal
dirigisme limiting the range of policy options5 7 To conclude on
this point, while the Meech Lake Accord may have seen light as an
accommodation offered to Quebec, it represented through its
generalization of the items Quebec brought to the negotiating table,
more of a pan-Canadian arrangement. It was, in fact, especially
important for the first explicit constitutional recognition which it
gave to the latent "states rights" theory of the Canadian federation
lying at the heart of Western alienation.
A final comment on the symbolism of the Meech Lake
Accord is a variation on the previous point, and relates specifically
to the amending formula and to the "distinct society" clause. For
here one sees the real foundation of Quebec's concerns. Take first
the proposed amending formula. As with each of the other features
of the Meech Lake Accord, the precise content of the modifications
to the amending formula were not of Quebec's making. Why
Quebec's understandable insistence on regaining a semblance of a
55 For a detailed elaboration of this point see Petter, supra, note 30.
56 For a discussion of this model of federalism, see D.V. Smiley & R.L. Watts, Intrastate
Federalism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
57 It should be remembered that many of the most distinctive policy programmes in
Canada had their origins in provincial initiatives: Ontario Hydro (an energy initiative picked
up federally only in the 1970s with the creation of PetroCanada); hospitalization and medical
insurance (which had its origins in Saskatchewan twenty years before Ottawa climbed on
board) and the Caisse de ddp6t et placement (an extremely successful Quebec initiative
established in 1965, which Ottawa has not yet had the wisdom to copy).
1991]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
veto on a number of key points had to translate into a veto for all
provinces on each of the section 42 matters is, unlike the other
generalizations of Quebec's concerns, difficult to understand or to
accept. As the failure of two small provinces which together
comprise less than ten per cent of Canada's population to ratify the
Meech Lake Accord revealed, a unanimity formula may be
unworkable if constitutional change is desired. But some
accommodation of the concept of a Quebec veto was required, and
on this ground of objection there may still be a conflict between
Quebec's minimum expectations and the irreducible opposition of
some of the Meech Lake Accord's erstwhile opponents.
Similarly, there appears to have been direct conflict over the
very idea of recognizing Quebec as a distinct society. Yet, in the
final analysis, it is the symbolism of Quebec's distinctiveness which,
fundamentally, is what the Meech Lake Accord was about. As will
be argued in the next section, there were, and still are,
unimpeachable reasons for adopting a constitutional amendment by
which Quebec is so recognized. For the moment, it bears repeating
that it was unfair to criticize the Meech Lake Accord as being only
a Quebec project on the four other grounds which have little to do
with the specific objectives advanced by the Quebec government. In
view of such misguided critiques, one can well understand the anger
and frustration of Quebec politicians and the general public who saw
some of the last-minute, off-the-shelf, pseudo-objections from critics
in provinces initially signatory to the Langevin text as no more than
devious ways of expressing anti-Quebec sentiment in another form.
As is now apparent, the symbolism of rejection which such reversals
implied is far more dangerous to Canada's future than the costs
thought by some to attend what have been canvassed here as the
other positive Meech Lake Accord symbolisms.
The points made in this section can be summed up with
some general observations about the Meech Lake Accord as a
constitutional symbol. To begin, independently of its specific
content, the very concept of the Meech Lake Accord, became in
Quebec an important expression of constitutional faith. It became
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a symbol of recognition, of acknowledgment, of acceptance.5 8  In
Canada as a whole, it could also have become a powerful symbol,
as well as an invitation to further reconstruction of the federation.
These symbols - the one acquired, the other never discovered 9 -
comprised one key aspect of the real meaning of the Meech Lake
Accord for Quebec and for Canada. The second aspect of the
Meech Lake Accord's symbolic meaning is more subtle. Every
feature of the Meech Lake Accord, apart from the "distinct society"
clause itself, reflected the attempt to recognize that Quebec is a
province unlike the others without appearing in so many words to
say so. Hence, all particular items, except the minor concession of
a Quebec monopoly on recommendations of nominees to the
Supreme Court trained in civil law, were addressed equally to every
province. The tacit recognition of this specificity, in fact, has been
the consistent theory of Canadian constitutional arrangements since
the Quebec Act, 1774:60 accommodate Quebec's particularity as far
as possible by provisions which, on their face, apply indiscriminately,
but which, in their conception and their expected execution, are
designed with Quebec in mind.61  For the art of Canadian
constitutionalism has been to find the formulae and the practices
62
58 One of the best expositions of this feature of the symbolism of the Meech Lake Accord
is G. Laforest, "The Meaning of Centrality and Recognition" in Gibbins, ed., Perspectives From
the West, supra, note 22 at 73.
59 It is not a mere coincidence that the failure of the Meech Lake Accord (an acquired
symbol within Quebec) to achieve such symbolic recognition in the rest of Canada parallels
exactly the failure of the Charter (an acquired symbol outside French-speaking Quebec) to
be discovered and internalized as a constitutional symbol within Quebec.
60 (U.K.), 14 Geo. 3, c. 83.
61 This theme, though understated, has been acknowledged in the political science
literature about Canadian federalism. See, for example, R. Gibbins, Conflict and Unity: An
Introduction to Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1985) and D.V. Smiley, The
Federal Condition in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987).
62 The various formulas in the Constitution Act, 1867 which reflect this ambition have
been canvassed in the first part of this essay. The relevant constitutional practices are many.
Only a few need be mentioned to make the point: (i) the notion of a Quebec-lieutenant
whenever a non-Quebec M.P. holds the leadership of one of Canada's major federal political
parties; (ii) the alternation since 1951 in Governors-Generalship between English and French-
speaking appointees; (iii) a similar, but less rigorously observed, alternation in the Chief
Justiceship of the Supreme Court of Canada - since Duff, an alternation only not observed
when Dickson succeeded Laskin; (iv) patterns of federal Cabinet-making which ensure that
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by which these two basic federative themes - distinctiveness
(compact) and equality (statute, and latterly states-rights) - can be
reconciled. In the final analysis, it is difficult not to agree that the
Meech Lake Accord, especially when read in conjunction with the
Charter, would have been faithful to this received tradition.
VI. BILL 178, THE SECTION 33 OVERRIDE, AND THE
DISTINCT SOCIETY CLAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL
VISIONS
The previous four sections present a reading of the
constitutional, historical, emotive, and symbolic contexts of the
Meech Lake Accord, especially as these contexts were understood
in Quebec. They were initially intended, at the time the Laskin
Lecture was delivered, to speak to the legitimating myths of past
and present in the construction of an overall Meech Lake Accord
mythology. Yet the agreement failed to achieve ratification. Hence
they cannot now serve as a perspective on the Meech Lake Accord
in terms of the Canada which would have resulted from ratification.
Nor can they offer much solace to those who sought to save the
Meech Lake Accord during the spring of 1990. But they can
illumine what the various strategies for achieving ratification then
proposed would have told us about the kind of polity Canadians
actually had, or were in the process of creating. Moreover, given
the likelihood of yet another constitutional round in which concerns
particular to Quebec will play a central role, these questions retain
their importance. 63
all major sectors - the economy, trade and commerce, agriculture, justice, et cetera - have
at least a junior minister from Quebec; (v) the practice that either the Speaker or the Deputy-
Speaker of the House of Commons is always from a Quebec constituency. That such
practices are known and recognized - in the legislative, judicial, executive, and political spheres
- suggests their importance to the functioning of the country.
63 Since the above text was written, Meech Lake Accord post-mortems have become an
industry on their own. See, for example, Monahan, After Meech Lake, supra, note 5;
Courchene, supra, note 29; Robertson, supra, note 19; Fournier, supra, note 34; P. Resnick,
Towards a New Canada Quebec Relationship (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press,
1991); R. Simeon, "Why Did the Meech Lake Accord Fail?" in Watts & Brown, eds, supra,
note Sat 15; Council on Canadian Unity, Looking Forwar4 Looking Back (Montreal: Council
on Canadian Unity, 1990). The first three of these texts are reprints of speeches delivered
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As a preliminary to this reconstructive exercise, however, the
several concerns with the process by which the Meech Lake Accord
was generated, as expressed by thoughtful commentators, should be
noted.64 First, it is troubling that the entire endeavour should have
been stage-managed by the Prime Minister as a "response to
Quebec's demands." 65 Again, one might reasonably object to the
manner in which the Langevin text was drafted out of the Premiers'
Accord at Meech Lake. One might also have wished that, once that
draft had been completed, Parliamentary and provincial legislative
hearings were held prior to the negotiation of a final draft. Further,
one might regret that the defenders of the Meech Lake Accord
steadfastly presented the agreement as unamendable. Finally, one
might take issue with the absence of a mechanism for obtaining
popular approval of the Meech Lake Accord. Yet, given Canada's
existing precedents, up to and including the 1982 round, and given
the mechanisms for amending the Constitution put into place by the
Canada Act 1982, it is hard to find legal fault with the process
actually followed. No doubt, in view of criticisms directed against
at various universities during the fall of 1990. While I agree with much of what is said in
them, I also disagree with much. For this reason, I am confirmed in my view that a
perspective from English-speaking Quebec on the Meech Lake Accord affair, and on Canada's
present conundrum, merits explicit statement. For an earlier attempt at such a statement, see
RA Macdonald, "Exiting From Meech Lake: Are There Lessons for Australia?" (1990) 1
Pub. L Rev. 299. See also C. Taylor, "Collision Courses Quebec-Canada" [hereinafter
Collision Courses] in Conference on the Future of Quebec and Canada (Montreal: McGill
University, 1990) 7 [hereinafter Conference].
64 Perhaps the most articulate of such commentators has been Alan Cairns. See, for his
most recent view, A.C. Cairns, "Constitutional Minoritarianism in Canada" in Watts & Brown,
eds, supra, note 5 at 71. Two very careful but slightly divergent discussions and ultimate
dismissals of these concerns have been presented by Monahan, ibid, at 22-24, and Simeon,
ibid, at 27-31.
65 1 mean to signal three ideas here which have not been picked up in other analyses.
They all relate to the partisan political dimension of the Meech Lake Accord, and to the
influence of the personal style of the key players. It is hardly surprising that a labour
negotiator would want to get the constitutional process untracked in 1985 by seeking an
agreement against the backdrop of claims asserted by one party. But there was nothing
inevitable about this means of attempting to address what has come to be known as Quebec's
exclusion in 1982. Second, it is also hardly surprising that the process should then have been
structured as a "trade-off' between players, in which the federal government (on any realistic
evaluation, also a player) was cast in the role of mediator. Third, it is hardly surprising that
the process should have been set up as a non-ideological and purely pragmatic exercise - in
counterpoint to the previous process, orchestrated by a committed ideologue.
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the Meech Lake Accord process, its replication in future
constitutional rounds is unlikely.66 But, for the precedential and
legal reasons just recited, these process concerns ought not to have
constituted a compelling reason for blocking ratification of the
Meech Lake Accord.
It follows from the above that none of those objections
raised to the specific content of the agreement or to the process by
which it was negotiated, should have stood in the way of ratification.
Yet, the attempt at major constitutional amendment which it
represented, like every other attempt apart from that of 1982,
ultimately was unsuccessful. A large part of the reason, it now
seems clear, was the reaction in the rest of Canada to the decision
in December 1988 of the Quebec government to enact Bill 178 in
order to counter the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Bill 101
case, and to invoke the section 33 override in so doing.67 For many
observers in the popular press, Bill 178 simply confirmed their
apprehension that the "distinct society" clause would permit and
perhaps even encourage the Quebec government to oppress its
English-speaking minority.6 Any evaluation of the "distinct society"
clause and the vision of Canada which it projected must, therefore,
commence with a discussion of Bill 178 and the override clause in
the Charter.
This is not the place to argue for a political theory under
which the concept of a limited Parliamentary override would be
defended as a legitimate constitutional device, although such an
66 Those who claim that, while legally correct, the process was politically flawed ought
to consider whether, had the government referred the issue to the Supreme Court, that body
would have found the process to be offensive to "convention," as it did with Prime Minister
Trudeau's first patriation attempt in 1981. In the text as initially written, it was recommended
that a key item of future constitutional negotiation would have to be the development of a
text specifying the actual processes by which future amendments are proposed, debated, and
ratified. Obviously, in view of the failure of ratification, the amendment process itself has
become an issue of major concern - a concern reflected in the Parliamentary Commission on
the amendment formula which sat throughout the winter months of 1991.
6 7 Ford, supra, note 45. For discussion of the override in the context of Bill 178 see L.E.
Weinrib, "Learning to Live With the Override" (1990) 35 McGill LJ. 541.
68 On the complexities of the relationship between Bill 178 and the demise of the Meech
Lake Accord see Fournier, supra, note 34 at 42-55.
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argument could be, and has been made by others.69 Moreover, the
decision by the Quebec government to invoke the override in
December 1988 was constitutionally unimpeachable. Both the form
and the substance of the override provision were respected. Bill 178
was a targeted, rather than a generalized, override. It was not pre-
emptive, but was deployed only following a declaration of invalidity
by the Supreme Court. It was not retroactive, but only prospective,
in operation. And the Charter infringement it was designed to cover
could not be characterized as disproportionate to the legislative
objective being pursued. Surely, if one is to have an override, this
is the way in which it should be deployed. As a final point, given
the time and place of its deployment, the invocation of the override
in Bill 178 was politically defensible, even if politically unwise. Here
is why.
Once Premier Bourassa failed to revise Bill 101 immediately
after the 1985 provincial election, or at the latest when the existing
override clauses lapsed in the spring of 1987, he was compelled
politically to await the judgment of the Supreme Court before
acting. Presumably, and in retrospect, most commentators would
agree that the wisest strategy, once the unfavourable Supreme Court
decision was rendered, would have been simply to re-enact Bill 101
with the override. 70 This would have given the government the time
to work out a new "Bill 1"71 which would address other concerns -
the real threats to French language and culture discussed above - as
well as to seek an accommodation on the language of signs, in the
calmer political climate likely to emerge after the ratification process
for the Meech Lake Accord was completed. In this sense, the
Premier was right to argue that with the constitutional accord
ratified, the deployment of the override may not have been
necessary - not to salvage Bill 178, but to serve as a symbolic
69 See Weinrib, supra, note 67 and also P.C. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a Democracy.
A New Canadian Version" (1984) 18 U. Mich. J.. Ref. 51.
70 Indeed, when asked about this question during an administrative law conference in the
fall of 1988 prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ford, supra, note 45, this was the
response I gave to a co-panellist who was a senior public servant in the Quebec Ministry of
Justice.
71 It should be remembered that Bill 101 was initially presented as Bill 1, but that
procedural bungling forced its withdrawal and reintroduction as Bill 101.
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surrogate and to support its likely replacement. For it is worth
noting that, for most opponents of Bill 178 (both in Quebec and
elsewhere), the actual substance of the legislation was not relevant;
once the government imposed any restriction on "rights" other than
within the limits traced by the Supreme Court, the political damage
was done. By 1988, the Charter had become an inviolate symbol,
just like the corresponding charter in Quebec, La Charte de la
langue fran~aise, had become an inviolate symbol.72 Thus, to have
used the override was a very costly error in the context of the
Meech Lake Accord debate, especially since Bill 178 was Premier
Bourassa's own Bill and not one he inherited from the Parti
Qu~b~cois.
Returning to the "distinct society" clause of the Meech Lake
Accord, it is important to distinguish two points in trying to meet
the concerns of those who fear the consequences of the clause: a
defensive or negative point, and an offensive or positive point. The
first requires evaluating the relationship, if any, between the
invocation of the notwithstanding clause in Bill 178 and the goals
which were being pursued by the "distinct society" clause of the
Meech Lake Accord. It demands an examination of what consti-
tutional impact on the legal powers of the Quebec National
Assembly the clause may have had. It also calls for an assessment
of whether the clause would have encouraged the National Assembly
in Quebec to pursue further the suspect aspects of its language
legislation, or whether it would have induced it to reconsider its
current understanding of the threats that English-speaking
Quebeckers really pose to la survivance. The second point suggests
the importance of providing a positive justification for the inclusion
of the "distinct society" clause in the Meech Lake Accord. It
requires the elaboration of a theory of Canada which acknowledges
Quebec's distinctiveness, and which celebrates the contributions of
72 It is a paradox that those who fall victim to Charter patriotism in the rest of Canada
are unable to see how French-speaking Quebeckers suffer from the same patriotic blindness
vis-a-vis their own Charte de la langue frangaise. "Ne touche pas A la loi 101" - on buttons,
on placards, spray painted on walls, and repeated incessantly on radio and television
programmes - is the pendant of the uncompromising attitude expressed by those who cannot
accept the use of the section 33 override under any conditions. Yet "Ne touche pas A la
Chane Canadienne," meaning "do not derogate from its specific guarantees", has a hypocritical
ring since section 33 already is in the Charter.
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French-speaking Canadians throughout the country to Canadian self-
definition.
The first of these points scratches the surface of racial
intolerance in Canada. During the ratification debate, there was a
current of opinion in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada which saw
the "distinct society" clause as simply a further example of the
xenophobic attitude of certain Quebec political elites which had
already led to repressive language legislation. On this view, Bill
22)73 Bill 101, and Bill 178 are interpreted as constituting a direct
assault on the English-speaking community of Quebec in a way
which makes it the scapegoat for the insecurity felt by the French-
speaking population of the province. Whatever the symbolism,
however, this feeling of being scapegoated is hard to understand
when one evaluates the total effect of various subsections of Bill 101
on the daily life of English-speaking Quebeckers. To begin, the
regulation of the language of the work place and the professions -
in itself a perfectly understandable phenomenon given past practices
of senior management in branch-plant factories and given the public
service monopoly of professionals - only restricts vocational
opportunity among unilingual Anglophones who are unable to pass
the most anodyne examinations or unwilling to apply for temporary
exemptions. Second, the limitations on access to English-language
schools (including access to French-immersion programmes in
English schools) are not jeopardizing the continuation of English-
language neighbourhood schools nearly as much as the desertion by
large segments of the anglophone population of the "public" school
system. The regulation of the language of commercial signs and of
advertising is a third aspect of Bill 101 which is often held up as
provoking insecurity, but which hardly bears on the public life of
citizens at all.74
73 Loi sur la langue officielle, S.Q. 1974, c. 6.
74 What seems to trouble many Anglophones is the assertion by Camille Laurin that the
prohibition was intended to remove the face of the English language from public places in
Quebec. The systematic renaming of parks, streets, and neighbourhoods - including the
substitution of Ren6 Lvesque for Lord Dorchester (who ironically did more to preserve
French-speaking Quebec than any other pre-Confederation Governor) on one of Montreal's
main thoroughfares - is another example of what is held out to be the conscious obliteration
of the English language from public view in the province. Yet the constant renaming of
toponymic features is a routine practice in all countries: even Toronto, it should be
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According to its most aggressive proponents, the official
agenda of Bill 101 and related statutes was twofold: to make
Francophones feel at home in Quebec and to overcome their
cultural insecurity; and to impress upon immigrants that French is
the operative language of Quebec. Yet, for some nationalists,
there is also a mean-spirited and petty underside to this agenda. 76
This fact helps to explain why Bill 101 has attracted widespread
support in this constituency as a symbol of vengeance for supposed
historical wrongdoing and arrogance by English-speaking Quebeckers,
and why it is now such a powerful symbol that the government
found itself politically unable to accede to the Supreme Court's
judgment in the Ford case. It is this thinly-disguised xenophobic
understanding of Bill 101 among certain "nationalist" sectors, rather
than its actual terms, which appears to be most problematic for
Quebec's linguistic minority. That is, even though the Charte can,
on one view, be seen as an undesirable initiative in a liberal
democracy, most English-speaking Quebeckers seem to have
accommodated themselves to most of its provisions. For they
recognize that the vast bulk of the restrictions in Bill 101 will be of
only short-term effect. A developing Francophone entrepreneurial
class is transforming the economy and the language of the work
place. Most Anglophones are enroling their children in French-
language or French-immersion programmes. The need for
duplicative English and French outdoor commercial signs is rapidly
diminishing. That is, the rapid accommodation of the English-
speaking community to the French face of Quebec ought to permit
the repeal (as being unnecessary) of most of the provisions of Bill
101 which concern civil libertarians.
But the Quebec government badly misread the political signs
among English-speaking Canadians. The ready accommodation of
remembered was once called York; just as Kitchener, Ontario was called Berlin prior to World
War I.
75 See Laurin, supra, note 38.
76 It is probably the attitude of some nationalist groups rather than the actual content
of Quebec's language legislation which led the Commissioner of Official Languages, D'Iberville
Fortier, to characterize the Charte de la langue frangaise as "humiliating" English-speaking
Quebeckers. See Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Repor4
1987 (Ottawa: The Commissioner, 1987).
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many English-speaking Quebeckers to Bill 101 misled the Bourassa
cabinet in its assessment of the likely reaction of this minority to
what it perceived as a too casual attitude towards political promises
made to it in the election campaign of 1985. Thus, while English-
speaking Quebeckers recognized and were largely prepared to accept
the cost imposed on them by the legitimate aspirations of the
government of Quebec to act as a vehicle for promoting and
preserving the French language, they were not prepared to pay an
unlimited price. Moreover, the general acceptance by political elites
in the rest of the country, through their adherence to the Meech
Lake Accord, of Quebec's claims for recognition of its distinctiveness
also misled the government into thinking that Bill 178 would not
be seen as unnecessarily repressive and as reflecting a certain
duplicity in the government's position. In retrospect, it appears that
there were three principal grounds advanced in the rest of the
country for treating the motives of the Quebec government in
seeking ratification of the Meech Lake Accord as suspect, and it is
these suspicions which linked the override in Bill 178 with the
"distinct society" clause of the Meech Lake Accord.77
A first query, which emerged from Ontario in particular,
relates to the paradox of the Quebec government seeming to claim
that it is a world-class economic competitor not afraid of the
unregulated market implied by the Free Trade Agreement, and at the
same time, claiming that it is threatened by the English language
and culture to the extent it must repress them.78 But this is only a
pseudo-paradox, for the objection fails to distinguish the social and
the economic aspects of modem politics. Normally one regulates
the economy for protectionist purposes, and assumes (except in
Canada where a significant degree of regulation of periodicals, the
recording industry, radio and television, movies, and so on has had
cultural objectives for a long time) that social regulation is
77 For a much more sanguine assessment of the opposition to the Meech Lake Accord
and its none-too-subtle racist undertones in English-speaking Canada, see Fournier, supra,
note 34.
78 One of the most vocal critics had been Philip Resnick, a professor of social-
democratic political views who goes so far as to characterize Quebee's support of the Free
Trade Agreement as a sell-out. See P. Resnick, Leters to a Quebec Friend (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1990).
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unnecessary.79  That Quebec's resource-based economy should
induce the reverse public policy is not inherently implausible. Thus,
simply because the government believes that Quebec industry can
compete ininternational markets does not mean that the case for
cultural and linguistic regulation is any less strong. One might even
point to Ontario's own embrace of the Autopact at the same time
that it was restricting the use of American-produced educational
textbooks in its primary schools as an analogous policy to that now
pursued in Quebec.
A second ground for suspicion of the motives of the Quebec
government arose from its apparent failure to distinguish between
public and private spheres of regulatory activity. That the
government should refuse to put up English-language highway signs
is one thing. That it should regulate the use of language in the
private sphere is quite another. Yet, this is also not a compelling
point. All lawyers accept that the public/private distinction is largely
conventional and that its precise frontiers at any given time are
politically driven.80 For example, would it have seemed appropriate
fifty years ago for governments to regulate conditions of membership
in social clubs, the discipline of children in the privacy of the home,
the occasions for smoking cigarettes in private establishments such
as restaurants, or the posting of egress signs in commercial office
towers? In an important sense, the present debate in Quebec
around the provisions of Bills 101 and 178 is as much about
differing conceptions of the locus of the public/private divide for the
purposes of governmental regulation as it is about commercial signs.
That such differences exist between the policies of the Quebec
government and the policies pursued by other governments in
Canada in language legislation, as well as in almost all other forms
of regulatory activity, should not be taken as evidence of a hidden
linguistic agenda. It should, rather, be seen as one more piece of
concrete evidence of Quebec's socio-political distinctiveness.
79See, for example, G.B. Doern, The Politics of Economic Policy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985).
80 The law review literature on this point is enormous. An important canvassing of the
issue in respect of the Charter is set out in AC. Hutchinson & A. Petter, "Private Rights/
Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278.
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The third reason why many felt the motives of the Quebec
government in enacting Bill 178 to be suspect flows from the easy
transition that its representatives and spokespersons habitually make
in constitutional discourse between questions of form and questions
of substance. Sometimes the Quebec government acts for reasons
of pure form or symbolism; when it is made aware that its policies
have little or no substantive impact, it insists on the importance of
form. Yet, when other Canadian political actors make purely formal
gestures (especially in relation to linguistic equality), the Quebec
government insists that substance is crucial and that mere symbolic
efforts are insufficient. This uneasy tension between form and
substance in the political discourse of the Quebec government is not
intentionally duplicitous, but is consistent with the standard
behaviour of political minorities.81  Not surprisingly, this same
tension between form and substance has become increasingly
apparent in the political claims of Quebec's English-speaking
minority since 1977, which criticizes the government on substantive
grounds in connection, for example, with hospitals and education,
and on symbolic grounds in relation, for example, to levels of public
service recruitment.
This brief discussion of Quebec language legislation (and
especially of the invocation of the notwithstanding clause in Bill
178) points to an important lesson for English-speaking Canadians.
Whatever has been the position of Quebec "nationalists" on the
question, Bill 178 reflects an agenda for the present government
which is neither xenophobic nor spitefully repressive. Indeed, one
sees evidence that the government is seeking other legislative
symbols such as a new Civil Code, an enhanced Human Rights
Code, and an explicit Provincial Constitution for Quebec as means
of promoting a 1990s variant of the great construction of public
81 One of the best reflections of this double aspect of minority behaviour is Dufour,
supra, note 7. See also, C. Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have To Become States?" in S.G.
French, ed., Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal: Canadian Philosophical
Association, 1979) 19 for an attempt to provide a philosophic grounding for the "identity'
claims of minorities. But, compare Kymlicka, Liberalism, supra, note 2, who rejects Taylor's
"quasi-communitarian" claim.
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institutions of the 1840-1865 period in Canada East.82 If the Meech
Lake Accord had been ratified, this reconstruction would have soon
displaced language from the centre of the political stage. While one
might have wished, during the ratification debate, to tell Premier
Bourassa to toughen up and to not be intimidated by "ultra-
nationalists," xenophobes, and outright racists, his weakness of
political leadership on certain aspects of the language question
should not be taken as conclusive of the government's basic position
on the issue. The government's failure to find the right formula in
Bill 178 for reconciling Charter rights with a positive legislative
programme responsive to aspirations of French-speaking Quebeckers
does not mean that no such formula exists. Nor does it mean that
there is no place for the section 33 override in Quebec language
legislation, absent some other vehicle for accommodating the special
concerns of the Quebec government. This point can be taken even
farther. The transition, contemporaneous with the Meech Lake
Accord process, from the previous indiscriminate insertion of the
override into all Quebec statutes by the Parti Qu6brcois government
to its specially targeted and restricted deployment in Bill 178 by the
current government was a positive signal. By attempting to induce
a general acceptance of the Charter ethos within Quebec this
transition also suggests that the "distinct society" clause should have
been encouraged as a preferred solution to the question of how to
balance Charter absolutes and practical politics.83
To test this last hypothesis, it is worth speculating about
what would have occurred had Bill 178 or its equivalent first come
forward for discussion after the Meech Lake Accord had been
ratified. Presumably, the Quebec government would not have
immediately inserted the section 33 override. Rather, it would have
argued that the Meech Lake Accord's provision, by which "the role
of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve and
promote the distinct identity of Quebec referred to in paragraph
(1)(b) is affirmed," would have authorized Bill 178s provisions
restricting the language of outdoor commercial signs. On this
82 See A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans,
Green, 1946).
83 See Laforest, supra, note 58 at 84-86 for a similar point.
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assumption, it is clear that there would be a conflict between the
freedom of expression guarantee in section 2 of the Charter and Bill
178. To resolve this conflict it would then have been necessary to
read section 1 of the Charter in conjunction with section 2(3) in
such a way as to produce a new siamese "distinct" but "free and
democratic" society test. That is, the role of the Quebec
government in preserving and promoting Quebec's distinct identity
would have to be understood as a factor to be evaluated in
determining whether or not the provisions of Bill 178 constitute
reasonable limits on Charter rights which are demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.
It follows that one of the major points of concern about the
"distinct society" clause (that it would automatically override the
Charter) rests on a dubious theory of constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, the claim that it was necessary to state explicitly in the
Meech Lake Accord that the Charter would or would not trump the
"distinct society" clause seems pointless8 4 Was such a statement
necessary in respect of section 27 of the Charter? Constitutional
interpretation is not only an exercise in logical pre-emption. The
way in which constitutional arguments grounded in the Meech Lake
Accord would likely have been raised is such that the "distinct
society" clause would not have added significantly to the scope of
tolerance for legislation that section 1 analysis already contains. For
this reason, the various claims advanced by the Quebec government
about the impact of the "distinct society" clause on Bill 178 were
most unfortunate. For, had the Meech Lake Accord been ratified,
these claims would have raised expectations in Quebec as to its
purport; expectations bound to have been frustrated as often as met.
In addition, these claims were often interpreted outside Quebec as
suggesting that the principal bearing of the clause would have been
its anti-civil libertarian orientation rather than its symbolic and
positive implication about the importance to Canada of a province
with a French-speaking majority.
84 Nevertheless, pointless or not, it exercised Premier Wells and his advisers. It also
generated an extensive "commentary" industry during the ratification debate. See, for example,
the Alliance Quebec brief, "A Minority's Plea for the Supremacy of the Charter" in M.D.
Behiels, ed., The Meech Lake Priner: Conflicting Views of the 1987 Constituional Accord
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989) 225.
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To deny the pre-emptive effect of the clause in relation to
the Charter - in other words, to dissociate the "distinct society"
clause from the override of section 33 - is not to claim that it would
have had no effect. For the "distinct society" clause did have an
important role to play in signalling, for other political actors in
Canada, the cultural and linguistic challenges which Quebec is likely
to confront in the years ahead. It may also have had a role in
legitimating reasonable arguments, as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, in favour of marginally accrued provincial political
power, and as a matter of constitutional negotiation, for more
informal joint jurisdiction. Thus, in paramountcy questions, the idea
of a "distinct society" might well have been capable of being pleaded
as an interpretive point to assist the court in finding no conflict
between federal and provincial legislation. Again, when balancing
the scope of property and civil rights against the federal trade and
commerce power in connection with the regulation of federal
companies, for example, the clause might also have helped to sustain
the constitutionality of provincial legislation. Similar claims
conceivably could also have been made about the administration of
justice in the province including, possibly, a revised understanding of
the meaning of section 96 as this bears on Quebec administrative
tribunals. It is apparent, then, that whatever the marginal
jurisdictional effect of the "distinct society" clause, it would in no
way have disrupted the balance of the Constitution in a manner
which facilitated the repressive aspects of the Bill 101 agenda, a
point of course, which is expressly noted in section 2(4) of the
Meech Lake Accord.85
Another likely consequence of the "distinct society" clause
was the negotiating room which it probably would have given the
province in bilateral relations with Ottawa. Undoubtedly, the clause
would have had an impact not only in respect of the Meech Lake
Accord's provisions relating to immigration and shared-cost
programmes - where it would have been invoked as a political
reason for Quebec to move in its own directions - but also in
85 It is also worth noting that not only would the "distinct society" clause not have saved
Bill 178, it might well have induced the Quebec government to enact legislation more in
keeping with the decision of the Supreme Court in Ford, supra, note 45, enlarging only
marginally the scope given to it by that decision.
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matters not yet on the intergovernmental negotiating table. These
matters could have included regulation of government procurement
contracts, authority over provincial cable television, the appointment
of section 96 judges, income tax points, and so on; all of which,
after the demise of the Meech Lake Accord, have been demanded
as exclusive jurisdiction by Quebec in the Allaire Report.8 6 As it
related to this type of political negotiation, there is some plausibility
to the claim that Quebec might have benefitted from an increased
special status under the "distinct society" clause. But the special
status it would have acquired was not, as many opponents of the
Meech Lake Accord thought, new legislative jurisdiction; rather it
would have been a further constitutional confirmation of the
political special status which Quebec has always enjoyed.
These comments suggest that the "distinct society" clause
should have been understood as having, as its primarily purpose, a
positive constitutive statement affirming the special role which has
devolved to the Quebec government and National Assembly in
promoting French-language and culture in Canada. It should not
have been seen primarily as a negative regulatory clause which could
have been deployed to oppress the English-speaking minority in
Quebec, or even to provide a non-section 33 justification for
Charter-offensive legislative programmes. That this was the better
interpretation is confirmed by the fact that even English-speaking
constitutional scholars in Quebec opposed to the Meech Lake
Accord, acknowledged that the "distinct society" clause or some
similar version of it could have made a positive contribution to
constitutionalism in Quebec and Canada.
What this contribution might have been - the second
thematic point in relation to meeting concerns about the clause -
will now be addressed. What kind of framework could have been
developed for understanding the potential of the "distinct society"
clause as a pan-Canadian symbol? Given the variety of objections
which were raised to the very notion of a "distinct society" clause,
86 See Allaire Report, supra, note 36 at 40-50.
8 7 Moreover, it would simply have been a textual expression of the fact that even though
the Canadian Confederation was built on "special status" arrangements for all provinces, the
status afforded to Quebec has always been somewhat more "special." For a brief rehearsal
of the examples in respect of other provinces, see Hogg, supra, note 16 at 13-14.
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the case for its adoption can best be built by considering these
objections. Both the Manitoba Task Force report of 21 October
198988 and the Newfoundland proposals, circulated only the day
before the First Ministers' meeting of 8 November 1989,89 stated
quite well the symbolic arguments against the clause, as viewed from
a particular "national/centrist" perspective. For Manitoba, the basic
concern was that the clause was too focused on the particular needs
of Quebec and, consequently, was not a "Canada" clause. It was
argued especially that there were other Canadian interests - of
Native peoples, of women, of multicultural groups - which were
deserving of equal constitutional recognition. For Newfoundland,
the concern was also that the "distinct society" clause would
confound the French language and culture with the Quebec
government. In so doing, it would make the position of non-
Quebec Francophones more vulnerable, and would unduly enhance
the legislative powers of one province beyond those of all other
provinces.
The key elements of the Manitoba objection have already
been partially responded to in Part I of this essay through the
evocation of the compact theory of Confederation, of the changing
socio-economic circumstances of Quebec since 1867, and of the
feeling of betrayal accompanying the "midnight deal" which put
together the 1982 repatriation agreement over the objection of the
Quebec government and in perceived disregard of the promise of
renewed federalism made during the 1980 referendum campaign.
But there are two additional points in response to the Manitoba
Report which merit notice. Most importantly, it is to be noted that
the "distinct society" clause was only a part of section 2, a section
which was also about bilingualism in Canada. Surely this has been
such a fundamental characteristic of the country (at least until
recently), too long ignored outside Quebec, that a constitutional
round in which it predominates was not inappropriate. Second, if
the circumstances traced earlier in this essay were not sufficient to
88 Manitoba Task Force on Meech Lake, Report on the 1987 Constitutional Accord (21
October 1989) (Chair W.N. Fox-Decent).
89 Newfoundland & Labrador, Constitutional Proposal: An Alternative to the Meech Lake
Accord (9-10 November 1989).
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justify a constitutional round also being, for once, largely devoted to
addressing the concerns raised by Quebec over the past fifty years,
then one should be very pessimistic about the future of the country.
Surely it was not necessary, given the unfinished agenda of the
Charter in respect of Aboriginal rights and regional alienation from
the central government, to require that the Meech Lake Accord
aspired to a comprehensiveness and finality not even demanded of
the 1982 amendment. Indeed, as already noted in Part V, as a
matter of historical practice, each exercise of Canadian constitutional
reform, including the reform of 1867, has never pretended to be
comprehensive. Far from the Meech Lake Accord constituting a
revolutionary step in Canada's constitutional amendment practice, it
was the attempt to transform the Meech Lake Accord into a
comprehensive package that would have been truly revolutionary.
As long as the Quebec government expressed a commitment to
further constitutional renewal (which was the case), and as long as
nothing in the Meech Lake Accord directly foreclosed these further
amendments (which was also the case), the Manitoba argument,
about the "distinct society" clause being too focused on Quebec,
ought to have lost almost all its force.
As for the complementary claim, advanced in both Manitoba
and Newfoundland Reports, that the "distinct society" clause was
flawed because it was not a Canada clause that spoke to the rights
of linguistic minorities across the country but just to those of
French-speaking Quebeckers, there are a number of responses. To
begin, it is to be remembered that just such a clause was initially a
part of the Mont Gabriel declaration. Second, the claim in the
Newfoundland proposal that the concerns of French-speaking
Canadians can be met through a system of concurrent majorities in
the Senate, and do not require any acknowledgment of the
responsibilities of the Quebec government, rests on two dubious
assertions: that it is the prevention of federal action which is key
to the future of the French language in Canada, and that the
realpolitik of the English and French languages in the country is
identical. Patently, as the previous sections have illustrated, this is
not the case. Moreover, the simple fact that a French-speaking
majority lives there means that Quebec is, within Canada, a province
not like the others. That the government of Quebec has a special
role to play in promoting the distinctive identity of the province
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means not just that the provincial government is acting for Quebec.
A strong cultural industry in Quebec is a sine qua non of
bilingualism and biculturalism throughout the country, and of the
continued flourishing of linguistic minorities in other provinces.
Lastly, sections 2(1)(a) and 2(3) did acknowledge the very bilingual
character of Canada that the Newfoundland proposal, in respect of
the Senate, sought to identify. While the "distinct society" clause
did speak to a special role for the Quebec government, this clause
was contained within a provision which asserted the bilingual
character of the whole country, and which committed all provincial
governments to preserving this fundamental feature of Canada.
It can also be said, in defence of the clause, that the view
according to which the "distinct society" clause was not a Canada
clause because it sought to create a hierarchy of Charter rights
simply cannot be sustained. No doubt, the Meech Lake Accord was
not elegantly executed in relation to the statement of Canada's
essential attributes. Even if one acknowledges that the Meech Lake
Accord was not the occasion to include specific references to Native
Canadians and to the country's multicultural heritage, the later
redraft of section 16 in the Langevin text to preserve expressly
Aboriginal rights and multiculturalism from the terms of section 2,
was unfortunate. For if one were to adopt a literalist (expressio
unius est exclusio alterius) approach to interpreting the Meech Lake
Accord (always an unwise strategy in constitutional interpretation),
one might be able to make a case that the Charter guarantees of
legal rights, political rights, and equality rights were to be devalued.
The inclusion of section 16 in the Langevin draft was a mistake, and
it would have been preferable that the relation of section 1 of the
Charter to the "distinct society" clause be left for the wisdom of
judicial interpretation. But this should not have been a fatal
objection to the Meech Lake Accord, especially in relation to any
negative inferences which might have been drawn about the impact
of the clause on section 28 of the Charter - the section in respect
of which most opposition of this nature emanated. 90 Would it have
90 See, for severe criticisms of the Meech Lake Accord along these lines, M. Eberts, 'T1he
Constitution, the Charter and the Distinct Society Clause: Why Are Women Being Ignored?"
in Behiels, ed., supra, note 84'at 302-20; B. Baines, "Women's Equality Rights and the Meech
Lake Accord' (1988) 52 Sask. L Rev. 265. For a contrasting opinion, from Quebec, see N.
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been likely that a government of Quebec - a province with more
women MNA'S, Cabinet ministers, judges, deputy ministers, and heads
of administrative agencies than others (both in absolute and in
percentage terms) - would deploy the "distinct society" clause for
such purposes? To sum up on this second point, there is no reason
that section 16 should not have been understood as the Senate
clause in the Meech Lake Accord was: not as devaluing unenumer-
ated rights, but rather as an indication that the concerns of Native
Canadians and the impact of Canada's multicultural heritage, in
addition to the provincial role in the Senate, would have to be
addressed in any future attempt at defining the country's
fundamental character.
The final objection often advanced against the "distinct
society" clause was that it would enhance the powers of one
province beyond those of others, and that it would effect the
political isolation of Quebec, with the result that two linguistic
enclaves would be produced in Canada. The first of these claims
has already been addressed in the demonstration that Quebec would
have received no additional legislative jurisdiction from the "distinct
society" clause.91 It remains to be considered whether the clause
promoted linguistic dualism in Canada. Section 2(1)(a) explicitly
recognized the bilingual character of the country, and section 2(2)
affirmed the role of all governments and executives (including those
of Quebec) to preserve that basic characteristic. If two linguistic
"enclaves" were to develop - a thought hardly conceivable given the
predominance of the English language in Canada - it would have
had to have been despite sections 2(1)(a) and 2(2). Moreover, the
"distinct society" clause (section 2(1)(b)) merely recognized that
Quebec is the only province in which French-speaking Canadians
constitute a majority. In other words, if one accepts the validity of
section 2(1)(a) - which all critics of the Meech Lake Accord
purported to do - a provision like section 2(1)(b) is the inevitable
see N. Dupld, "L'Accord du lac Meech: Les inqui~tudes f~ministes sont-elles fond~es?" in
R.A. Forest, ed., L'adhsion du Quebec a l'Accord du lac Meech: Points de vuejurisdiques et
politiques (Montreal: Thdmis, 1988) 65.
91 Almost as soon as the Meech Lake Accord was negotiated, this was perceived in
Quebec nationalist circles. For a typical reaction, see G. Bouthillier, "L'Accord du lac Meech:
Aucun pouvoir nouveau au Qudbec" (1987) 77 L'Action nationale 108.
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consequence? 2 Other provinces are not distinct in a constitutionally
relevant sense because there is no constitutional criterion (which
rises to the level of constituting a "fundamental characteristic of
Canada") out of which their distinctiveness emerges. To illustrate
this point, an analogy may be drawn with the claims of Aboriginal
Canadians. Suppose a clause stating that the existence of Aboriginal
Canadians (assuming the desirability or the possibility of treating
Canada's various First Nations as an undifferentiated unity)
concentrated in province or territory X or Y, but present elsewhere
in Canada, were to constitute a fundamental characteristic of the
country. Would it be absurd, divisive, or dualist to characterize that
province or territory where they constituted a majority and where
they could control the legislature as a "distinct society"? Would it
be absurd, divisive, or dualist to charge the legislature and
government of that province or territory with a special role in
preserving and promoting that identity? Of course not. Indeed, one
should think that this kind of constitutional recognition would be an
important achievement for Native Canadians and should be
promoted. Moreover, to insist that the best way to ensure the
survival of the French language in North America is simply to
strengthen bilingualism misses the "critical mass" point. Not
surprisingly, it is typically advanced by those of majority cultures
and, especially in Canada, by Anglophones and Anglophone
politicians who are not themselves bilingual. There is nothing at all
incompatible with charging a government to take special care in one
matter, while imposing general obligations on other governments
which can only be fully realized if the first objective is met.93
92 The point is put very effectively by J. Woehrling, "A Critique of the Distinct Society
Clauses Critics" in Behiels, ed., supra, note 84 at 171.
93 One of great misunderstandings of the "distinct society" clause among those opposed
to the Meech Lake Accord was the belief that it could be easily renegotiated, by redrafting,
into something that it was not. While the clause was not elegant, while there were other
features of Canada which could have been expressed in it, and while it may have been best
stated as a preamble rather than a substantive section of the amended Constitution Ac 1867,
these options were simply not on the table by the fall of 1989. The only question thereafter
was: 'Was the clause in its original form inimical to the basic structure of Canada, and did
it foreclose further constitutional renovation directed to identifying other fundamental features
of the country?" The question certainly was not: "Is this the best such clause that could have
been drafted?" - a point Premier Wells never, it seemed, could grasp.
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Having addressed the various critiques advanced against the
"distinct society" clause and having attempted to show that the
negative view of the country which critics attributed to it was
patently false, it is now appropriate to state in positive terms the
vision of Canada which it, and by implication the entire Meech Lake
Accord, presupposed. 94 When one examines globally the basic
mythologies sustaining critiques of the "distinct society" clause - that
it would have permitted Quebec to override the Charter, that it
would have encouraged the oppression of linguistic minorities, that
it would have devalued other fundamental characteristics of Canada,
and that it would have promoted a "two separate states" concept of
the country - it is apparent that they all have at their root a
peculiar version of the political theory of liberal individualism.
95
That is, these criticisms all presumed the desirability of a non-
interventionist role for the state; and they sought exclusive
recognition of discrete persons as political agents. Not surprisingly,
adherents of this type of political theory invariably have adopted the
statute view of Confederation, have been strong centralists who
barely tolerate provincial jurisdiction, and have been consistent
supporters of entrenched civil liberties guarantees.9 6  The richness
of Canada's constitutional traditions, including its organic or
communitarian facets as reflected in Tory and socialist political
ideologies, is constantly trivialized by those who would reduce all
politics to the relationship of individual to state.97 Any mediating
94 For a similar analysis of the possibilities of the Meech Lake Accord, see Laforest,
supra, note 58.
95 For an analysis of this version of liberal individualism, as applied to Pierre Trudeau,
see R. Whitaker, "Reason, Passion and Interest: Trudeau's Eternal Liberal Triangle" (1980)
4 Can. J. Pol. & Soc. Theory 5.
96 At the risk of lumping together some very disparate types, I would claim that this sort
of ideological orthodoxy sustained the critiques of John Whyte, Alan Cairns, Deborah Coyne,
Eugene Forsey, Howard McConnell, Bryan Schwartz, and Stephen Scott. For relevant
citations to their collective oeuvre see, D. Herperger, 'The Meech Lake Accord: A
Comprehensive Bibliography' in Watts & Brown, eds, supra, note 5 at 271-289.
97 For alternative perspectives, see C. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the
Modem Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), and M. Walzer, Spheres of
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equaliy (New York* Basic Books, 1983). See also, M.
McDonald, 'The Forest in the Trees: Collective Rights as Basic Rights" in G. Lafrance, ed.,
Ethique et droitsfondamentaux (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989) 230.
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social institutions - religion, culture, language (and even smaller
political units such as provinces) - are viewed with suspicion.
Moreover, any recognition that groups and societies should be the
object of constitutional regard is anathema because it suggests an
active and constitutive role for a country's political agencies, in
which state institutions contribute to the achievement of positive
freedom.
This point can be restated by reference to the case for, not
against, the Meech Lake Accord. Obviously, the Meech Lake Accord
did not present an unambiguous communitarian vision for Canada.
Indeed, it is not clear what such a vision would look like in its
detail. Further, the exigencies of political compromise are normally
too present in Canada to permit a single ideology to capture any
given exercise of constitutional reform. But the primary thrust of
the Meech Lake Accord was to restate for the post-Charter era, the
communitarian component of Canadian political life. It was to
remind Canadians that representation based on difference as well
as abstract equality, that political rationality as well as juridical fiat,
that the heterogeneity of "bi" and "multi" as well as the homogeneity
of "identity" and "unity," and that "obligations towards" as well as
"rights against" are equally important features of Canadian
constitutionalism. The "distinct society" clause was an important
reminder of these points, not only for Quebec, to which it was
specifically addressed, but for all Canadians. For even had the
Meech Lake Accord achieved ratification, Canadians would soon
have been called upon again to give positive recognition in the
Constitution to the diversities of gender, region, Aboriginal ethnicity,
culture, economic resources, and, perhaps, even religion.98  The
clause was also a confirmation that governments have positive
obligations to legislate in certain matters, as well as negative duties
not to legislate in certain others. Despite the homogenizing
98 For various explorations of this theme in Canada, see G. Bourque, "La sociologie,
l'Etat, la nation" (1990) 14 C. de rech. sociologique 153; D. Howes, "In the Balance: The
Art of Norman Rockwell and Alex Colville as Discourses on the Constitutions of the United
States and Canada" (1991) 29 Alta L Rev. 1; R.A. Macdonald, 'Tears Are Not Enough" in
J. Whyte & I. Peach, eds, Re-fonning Canada?: The Meaning of the Meech Lake Accord and
the Free Trade Agreement for the Canadian State (Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Inter-
governmental Relations, Queen's University, 1989) 9. See also, more generally, A. Etzioni,
"Toward an I and We Paradigm" (1989) 18 Contemp. Soc. 171.
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tendencies of the Charter, it is apparent that these obligations and
duties touch the preservation and promotion both of shared national
values, and of the various diversities which together comprise these
national values.99
The gravamen of this section has been that the recognition
of Quebec as a "distinct society" and the acknowledgment of the
role of the Quebec government in preserving and promoting
Quebec's distinct identity were necessary components of the Meech
Lake Accord. The explicit recognition of a longstanding
constitutional fact which they reflected was made necessary primarily
by the disruption in the equilibrium of Canadian constitutionalism
brought about by the centralist and individualist character which the
now "official" reading of the Charter projects. Read as a whole, and
understood in its historical context, section 2 was a genuine (if
flawed) "Canada" clause. It did not override the Charter, nor did it
create a hierarchy of rights, nor did it operate like section 33 to
permit a variety of regional differentiations in Charter rights. It did
not vest new constitutional jurisdiction in Quebec and so radically
change the Confederation agreement of 1867 as to make Quebec a
non-province rather than the province unlike all the others which
it has always been. Further, it did not license the government of
Quebec to oppress its English-speaking minority, nor relieve the
governments of other provinces of their obligations towards their
French-speaking minorities. In short, the clause would have
recognized the communitarian component which has always been
present in Canadian constitutionalism. In doing so, it would also
have promoted, rather than impeded, the recognition of
multiculturalism and Aboriginal rights in future rounds of
constitutional amendment. In this respect, the "distinct society"
clause, and section 2 of which it is a part, could have been
understood - had its vocation "not been sabotaged by the unfair and
irresponsible attacks of the acolytes of Pierre Trudeau '"10° - as a
In the next section of this essay, an attempt will be made to trace out what these
values are.
100 This particular characterization of the efforts of Pierre Trudeau, widely held in
Quebec today, is drawn from Fournier, supra, note 34 at 47.
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powerful Canada clause contributing positively to Canada's self-
definition in the years ahead.
A final observation about the vision of Canada implicit in
the Meech Lake Accord flows from the relationship between the
"distinct society" clause and the override clause in the Charter. The
recourse to section 33 in Bill 178 - an Act which directly affects
English-speaking Quebeckers more than most other Canadians - was
a constitutionally permissible act under the Charter itself. Far from
being a reason for objecting to the "distinct society" clause, it should
have been seen as an important reason for including such a clause
in the Meech Lake Accord. For if the "distinct society" clause were
to have induced among French-speaking Quebeckers the will to
adhere to the 1982 process, and to let lapse permanently the blanket
section 33 override, and if it were to have impelled the Quebec
government to justify colourable legislation (including certain
provisions of La Charte de la langue fran~aise) first on that basis,
rather than by means of the section 33 fiat, it would have achieved
a major advance in Canadian constitutionalism. After all, is not the
dialectic of political discussion - hedged as it is by concepts of
reasonableness and proportionality - preferable to the fiat of
absolute legal exclusion which is authorized both by the concept of
inviolable constitutional rights announced in the Charter, and by the
idea of their modulation only through the section 33 override? The
"distinct society" clause, then, was explicitly non-revolutionary, and
unlike both the Charter and the override, it would neither have
commanded, nor authorized, legal discontinuities. For this reason
alone, the Meech Lake Accord was truer to Canadian constitutional
tradition than the 1982 patriation package. For this reason also,
even despite its inelegant drafting, it should have been welcomed as
a symbol which offered a promising vision of the country's future.
VII. THE RATIFICATION IMPASSE:
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS
If, as has been argued, the case for ratifying the Meech Lake
Accord could have been made out, what are individual Canadians to
[voL 29 No. 3
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make of the political impasse which led to its failure?101 More
generally, how are they to reconcile themselves (given the
inevitability of further constitutional discussions) to what seems to be
a tragi-comical political process whenever attempts are made to deal
with concerns emanating from Quebec?102 The detached commen-
tator, having observed the ratification process over its three-year
history, could be forgiven puzzlement about the wellsprings (and
101 Since this part of the essay also contains a perspective, I would like to state a few
caveats to the text so as to avert the reader to the ground on which I (and the analysis which
follows) stand. First, I was not a Meech Lake "insider" (as both Alan Cairns and Patrick
Monahan have used the term), and am not now an adviser to any government or interest
group. Second, I am not a "professional" constitutional lawyer. My interest in the Meech
Lake Accord process was as an Anglo-Quebecker and as a legal theorist, not as a purveyor
of conventional constitutional wisdom. Third, I formally support politically neither the
Progressive Conservative government in Ottawa nor the federal Liberal opposition. Neither
am I a partisan of either the provincial Liberal government or the opposition Parti Qudbecois.
Fourth, I am white, middle-class, middle-aged, bilingual, male, married with two children, and
was born, raised, and educated in central Ontario, and, therefore, carry this pedigree in all
claims to objectivity.
102 How else, but as comedy, can one explain the following paradoxes of the late-1989
through early-1990 ratification exercise. () The premier of one province, Alberta, threatening
revocation of a prior ratification unless the Prime Minister agreed to appoint a recently
elected Senate nominee whose only claim to consideration for the position flowed from the
provincial-input nomination scheme of the Meech Lake Accord - and yet who is on the record
as personally opposing the Meech Lake Accord. (2) The premier of another province,
Newfoundland, actually revoking a prior ratification in large measure on the bases that the
government of Quebec really did not understand what the people of Quebec wanted, and that
French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec, who by then overwhelmingly supported the Meech
Lake Accord initiative, did not know what was in their own best interest. (3) Three parties
in the Legislative Assembly with a minority government in another province, Manitoba, which
has systematically shown contempt for the constitutional rights of its French-speaking
population, even after the Supreme Court reminded it of its constitutional duty, objecting to
the Meech Lake Accord ostensibly because it did not speak for all Canadians and (if the press
releases of the Liberal opposition are to be believed) because Quebec "mistreated" its own
English-speaking minority by exercising constitutional rights that were legitimately open to it
under the Charter. (4) The premier of another province, New Brunswick, which had
recognized the fragility of the French language and culture in Canada and which, for twenty-
five years, made great efforts to support and nurture its minority Acadian population,
nonetheless objecting to the Meech Lake Accord partly on the basis that it recognized the
special role of the government of the one province where his province's linguistic minority
constitutes a majority to take steps to preserve and promote the language and culture of that
minority. (5) The premier of a province, Quebec, which strongly promoted ratification,
arguing that the Meech Lake Accord would have permitted his government to restrict more
effectively the rights of its linguistic minority, and that it should, therefore, be supported for
this reason. (6) The Prime Minister of Canada twice (in November 1989 and in June 1990)
engaging in a public squabble with recalcitrant premiers on national television in an attempt
to sell the Meech Lake Accord as a vehicle of "national reconciliation."
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backwaters) of Canadian political life, and about the ability of
Canadian political elites to understand what their country is about 03
There are, of course, those who even today argue that the
paradoxes of political behaviour displayed during the ratification
period were healthy because they illustrated clearly the folly of
ratifying the Meech Lake Accord, and because they showed
unequivocally that the most appropriate means of resolving the
constitutional conundrum created by the Meech Lake Accord was to
do nothing.1 04 These commentators also still believe that the Meech
Lake Accord was so flawed, and that its long-term consequences
would have been so pernicious, that it deserved to be scrapped
outright, whatever the consequences. In retrospect, it appears that
some among this group of academic nay-sayers actually played a key
role in advising the Premiers of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and
Manitoba. By hastening to point out flaws in the Meech Lake
Accord and by proposing "non-negotiable" amendments about cost-
sharing, immigration, .the Supreme Court nomination process, and
the amending formula (which would have effectively gutted the
Meech Lake Accord of its major operational terms) as a condition of
ratification, these advisers sought to ensure that, whatever its terms,
the Meech Lake Accord would never be ratified.105
103 It is no wonder that most Canadians now express mistrust of politicans and the
political process. For a measure of this mistrust, see the article on the Interim Report of the
Citizens Forum on Canada's Future (released 20 March 1991) in M. Valpy, "Canadians
Demand Radical Change, Spicer Forum Says" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 March 1991)
Al. See also the Angus Reid poll reported in the The [Montreal] Gazette (26 March 1991)
1, which places the popularity of the Prime Minister at less than fifteen per cent of
respondents.
104 For a strongly worded, though well argued, technical presentation of this position,
see S.A. Scott, "Remarks prepared for delivery to the Alberta Consitutional Reform Task
Force" (30 November 1990) [unpublished].
105 For an elaboration of this theme, see Fournier, supra, note 34. In the text of the
Laskin Lecture as delivered in November 1989, I suggested that there may have been hidden
motives to some of this opposition. Subsequent events seem to confirm this initial judgment.
Let me repeat the three examples of strategic behaviour I offered then. In the first place,
many of those who wanted the Meech Lake Accord made subject to the Charter were really
fighting a rear-guard action against the section 33 override, and were more or less attempting
to use their opposition to the Meech Lake Accord to pursue what they saw as the as yet
incomplete Charter package. Linking Bill 178 to Quebec's desire for ratification was thus a
device to have the override dropped from the Charter as part of the Meech Lake Accord
package. Second, many of those who resisted the "distinct society" clause in section 2(1)(b)
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The argument of this essay is, however, to the opposite
effect. Whatever the defects of the Meech Lake Accord as originally
negotiated, the issues it addressed were bona fide, and these issues
were resolved in a way that would have represented, on balance, an
important constitutional gain. Moreover, by late 1989, the realpolitik
of the constitutional moment was patent. Absent the political
dynamic then in play, one might have been inclined to recommend
a rewrite of various sections of the Langevin text, and to seek
ratification of a revised Meech Lake Accord. But by the final
months of the ratification period, the attitude of at least three of
the key players was so hardened that a strategy of reopening the
Meech Lake Accord could not have succeeded.10 6  Finally, the
realpolitik in the spring of 1990 was powerfully driven by what have
been characterized in this essay as the motifs, symbolism, and vision
of the Meech Lake Accord in Quebec. Regardless of its actual
effects, the agreement came to be perceived in that province as
Canada's reaffirmation of its commitment to Quebec. For this
reason, any attempt to "reopen" the Meech Lake Accord so as to
"improve" it would have been seen as equivalent to rejecting the
special urgency of Quebec's concerns and, thus, rejecting the idea
of the Meech Lake Accord itself.107
were not interested in improving the formulation of French/English relations in the Meech
Lake Accord by strengthening the injunction to the various governments to preserve and
promote bilingualism throughout Canada. Rather, they objected to the entire notion of the
Constitution as a compact between "founding peoples" suggested by section 2(1)(a), and sought
to have Canada's French-language commitments confined to Quebec, and then only within
the provincial sphere. Third, some political leaders saw a redraft of the "distinct society'
clause as a means of obliging the federal government to assume a larger share of the cost to
the provinces of providing bilingual services.
106 Both Prime Minister Mulroney and Premier Bourassa invested so much personal
credibility in the success of the Meech Lake Accord and, by doing so, raised the political
stakes of ratification so high with their rhetoric of "no amendments" and "the last chance" that
it would have been as ill-advised to redo the deal as it would to explicitly undo it. Moreover,
by then Premier Wells had said that he totally rejected the concept of Quebec being a
"distinct society," so it is difficult to see what gain would have resulted from tinkering with
other provisions of the Meech Lake Accord to effect marginal improvements.
107 It is now common opinion in Quebec, whether or not this is true, that the failure of
the Meech Lake Accord means that Canada said "no" to Quebec. See P. Fortin, "Quebec's
Forced Choice" in Conference, supra, note 63. In other words, the Meech Lake Accord was
seen as an opportunity for French-speaking Quebeckers to be both Canadians and Qudldcois.
Most understood its failure as putting them to the choice, and like Robert E. Lee in 1861,
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To put the matter slightly differently, those who argued for
rejection or radical amendment concentrated on the text of the
Meech Lake Accord as an abstract exercise of statutory drafting
rather than on the meaning of the Meech Lake Accord as a
constitutional artifact. Concomitantly, they failed to devote sufficient
attention to devising an "exit strategy" from a constitutional
amendment about the political foundations of Canada which had
been ratified federally and by the legislatures of eight provinces
containing more than ninety per cent of the country's population.
Without such an exit strategy, and without a detailed proposal for
cleaning up the political and constitutional debris attendant on
explicit rejection or implicit rejection through attempts at radical
amendment, talk of either option was highly irresponsible. 1 08
During the final months of the ratification period, many
politicians and commentators suggested (with good reason it is now
apparent) that, were the Meech Lake Accord rejected, people in all
parts of the country would probably lack the political will to restart
a meaningful constitutional reform process. For this reason, great
energy was devoted to finding mechanisms for modifying the Meech
Lake Accord in order to achieve ratification. While the political
costs of such a strategy were acknowledged to be quite high,109 they
were seen as being less than the cost of failure. Four main types of
avenue of escape from the ratification impasse attracted attention in
faced with such a choice, most of them are now saying: "I must go with my section." I do
not cite this example to suggest that the country is on the verge of warfare. It is offered,
rather, to illustrate the power of "sectional" arguments in federations once the centre forces
minority groups to make a choice of "nationalisms." For a thoughtful discussion of the appeal
of "section" in moments of constitutional conflict, and of Lee's decision in particular see
MacPherson, supra note 20 at 280-81.
108 For further development of this theme, see Macdonald, supra, note 63.
109 At the time the Laskin Lecture was delivered, three such costs were easily
identifiable. First, Premier Bourassa would have had to be given very good reasons (such as
the promise of more constitutional jurisdiction - and in this case real, not just symbolic,
jurisdiction) for retreating from his consistent "no parallel Accord" stance. Second, none of
the items reopened could undercut Quebec's minimum demands as formulated in 1986. Third,
the ratification of the Meech Lake Accord could not be postponed until any such parallel
Accord also achieved ratification. I was, consequently, doubtful that attempts to reopen the
Meech Lake Accord would be welcomed by other premiers; for any proposal for renegotiation
would not immediately advance the agenda of any of those who objected, even on reasonable
grounds, to the Meech Lake Accord as then drafted.
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the period between November 1989 and June 1990. These avenues
were: (1) negotiating a new side deal with Quebec which would
meet the concerns of objecting provinces; (2) negotiating a parallel
Accord for the same purposes with provinces other than Quebec;
(3) negotiating a series of parallel Accords with various provinces in
order to meet their own specific concerns or the concerns of a third
province; and (4) having the Governor-General proclaim the Meech
Lake Accord as a constitutional amendment by virtue of the general
amending formula of section 38(1)!11 While these suggestions now
have primarily a historical interest, they are worth examining briefly,
if only because variants upon the first and fourth are being mooted
as mechanisms for addressing Canada's current constitutional
agenda.111
Take first the possibility that the government of Quebec
would have been willing to reopen the Meech Lake Accord so as to
conclude a separate agreement (or "side deal" as it came to be
known) to address objections to the Meech Lake Accord. Because
the principles of the Mont Gabriel declaration were always
understood as Quebec's "minimum" demands, it would have been
most unlikely that the Quebec government would have assented to
other than relatively anodyne modifications.112 Further, the only
objection to the Meech Lake Accord which would have required an
explicit further agreement with Quebec (and could have been
achieved on that basis alone) concerned the affirmations contained
in proposed section 2, including their relation to the Charter. On
110 The mechanics of each of these various alternatives were set out in great detail in
the original Laskin Lecture. For obvious reasons, much of this detail has been deleted from
this version of the essay.
III See, for example, Monahan, supra, note 5 at 32-36. It should also be noted that
these same themes are also being addressed indirectly by the joint Senate/Commons
Committee on the Amendment Process.
112 These could have included, for example: (i) deleting the proposed section 25 Senate
provision; (ii) deleting references to all other provinces in the proposed section 95A
immigration clause and the proposed section 106A shared-cost programme clause; (iii) adding
the governments of the Northwest Territories and the Yukon to the proposed section 101C(4)
in connection with Supreme Court appointments; (iv) deleting some or all other provinces
from the unanimity requirement of proposed section 41; and, perhaps, (v) including references
to Native Canadians and multiculturalism as fundamental characteristics of Canada, and
enumerating special duties of other provinces to preserve and promote these characteristics
in additional subsections of section 2.
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this question, the agreement of Quebec to anything remotely
responsive to Newfoundland's objections would have been next to
impossible to obtain. Abandoning the positive statement of Quebec
constituting a "distinct society" and of the role of the Quebec
government and National Assembly in preserving and promoting
Quebec's "distinct identity" was unthinkable. It was also unthinkable
that, without major jurisdictional concessions, the Quebec govern-
ment would be willing to take the political risk of making the
"distinct society" clause expressly subject to the Charter.
A second strategy for overcoming the ratification impasse
would have been for the federal government to approach the
deadlock from the other end by attempting to negotiate a parallel
Accord with Canada's nine provinces other than Quebec. For
example, there was nothing preventing those provinces that wished
to re-fight the section 33 battle from unilaterally agreeing under
section 45 to amend their provincial constitutions so as to prohibit
the future invocation of the override. Nor was there anything
preventing them from renouncing their rights under proposed
sections 25, 95A, 101A, and 106A of the Constitution Act, 1867, or
the amending formula under proposed section 41 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, and individually ratifying such renunciations with federal
concurrance under section 43. But it is now apparent that many of
the decentralist objections to the Meech Lake Accord were primarily
strategic and intended to lever financial concessions from Ottawa.113
Yet another potential ratification strategy would have been
for the federal government and any province other than Quebec
which was really committed to the success of the Meech Lake Accord
to agree, by means of a section 43 amendment, to meet the
concerns of a third. Ontario was the most likely candidate for
113 In other words, it is highly unlikely that the other provinces would collectively have
given up the decentralist gains they achieved at Meech Lake in order to induce Quebec to
make the "distinct society" clause subject to the Charter. Once again, the attempt to salvage
the agreement by having Canada's nine other provinces renegotiate among themselves those
features of the Meech Lake Accord not directly applicable to Quebec - either by means of a
series of section 43 amendments or a general section 38 amendment (assuming the required
7/50 per cent criterion could be met) mistakes the degree of consensus likely to be achieved
between these provinces on the various outstanding issues. It is, for example, difficult to
conceive that Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia on the one hand, and Newfoundland,
New Brunswick, and Manitoba on the other, would find much common ground about the
centralist/decentralist balance to be struck.
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offering such concessions. Thus, should the exclusion of territorial
governments from section 101C(4) have been seen as a fatal flaw in
the Meech Lake Accord, Ontario could have met this objection by
offering to accept the addition of a section 101C(5), needing only
the approval of the federal Parliament in addition to its own that
it would include on its list of nominees for Supreme Court
appointment all names submitted to it by the two territorial
governments. This same strategy could have been generalized to
most other specific objections to the Meech Lake Accord.114  But
even were each of the concerns of recalcitrant constituencies to be
fully addressed by such ad hoc adjustments, ratification in hold-out
provinces would not necessarily have followed.
Each of the above strategies for salvaging the Meech Lake
Accord through the mechanism of a parallel Accord or Accords had
a certain attractiveness given the political impossibility of formally
amending the initial agreement. But each also had a high degree of
political unreality about it. Each presupposed a series of difficult
federal/provincial and interprovincial negotiations, and the willingness
of several governments to manage the passage of these various new
resolutions through their respective legislatures. Each also
presupposed that substantive agreement on how to make the Meech
Lake Accord universally acceptable could be achieved in a matter of
months - a highly unlikely event in view of the political agenda lying
behind Premier Wells' uncompromising opposition to the "distinct
society" concept. More tellingly, an eleventh-hour process of
patchwork tinkering to meet the objections of particular interests is
hardly a model of constitutional reform which has much to commend
itself.115
11 4 Various possible examples were raised in the Laskin Lecture. As a wealthier province
and a primary programme funder, Ontario could have agreed never to opt out of national
shared-cost programmes; or it could have agreed not to exercise its rights under section 95A
relating to immigration agreements; or it could have offered to give up some of its Senate
seats to "under-represented" provinces. It is worth noting that something akin to this last
suggestion was, in fact, offered by Ontario in the dying days of the ratification period.
115 Indeed, that any of these ideas were proposed (and taken seriously) suggests one of
the great weaknesses of the Canadian federal system - the absence of professional
intergovernmental affairs bureaucracies. Only Ottawa, Ontario, and Quebec maintain a
significant full-time bureaucracy to handle Canadian intergovernmental relations. The absence
of such professionals, meeting on an ongoing basis to sound out various proposals and
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The final avenue to achieve ratification would have had the
Queen's Privy Council for Canada advise the Governor-General to
issue a proclamation under section 48 declaring the Constitution of
Canada already amended pursuant to the procedure of section 38(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982. The constitutional ramifications of
proceeding in this fashion would have been fascinating. It would
have been necessary to assess both which parts of the Meech Lake
Accord could be proclaimed under section 38(1) and, if it could not
have been so proclaimed in its entirety, whether its provisions could
have been severed without the need for a new round of ratification
resolutions. Commentators were generally agreed that resort to a
section 38(1) proclamation could potentially have had the effect of
amending the Constitution so as to achieve five of the six elements
of the Meech Lake Accord.1 6 Yet, because the Meech Lake Accord
had been ratified by Parliament and in each province as a "package
deal" - that is, because the formal ratification resolution did not
distinguish the various specific amendments to the Constitution set
counter-proposals (constitutional or otherwise), is what permitted both Prime Minister Trudeau
(and more particularly, Prime Minister Mulroney) to attempt constitutional renovation by
personal persuasion of First Ministers. In view of this, it is not surprising that the three
governments which led the opposition to the Meech Lake Accord were those where
governments changed during the ratification process. The lesson of the Meech Lake Accord
failure is that personal processes of elite accommodation between politicians will not work any
more as a means of constitutional negotiation. The lesson is not, I believe, that "executive
federalism" in all its forms will not work and ought not to work. For the establishing of
intergovernmental affairs departments is the pendant of a true executive federalism which
mediates and is responsive to fundamental provincial and regional interests.
116 Given that the Meech Lake Accord proposals relating to the Senate and to the
Supreme Court did not touch the question of provincial representation, or the composition
of the Supreme Court as provided by subsections 41(b) and 41(d), respectively, but are rather
matters contemplated by subsections 42(1)(b) and (d), the general amending procedure under
section 38(1) would have been sufficient for their ratification. Moreover, neither immigration
nor shared-cost programmes appear on the list of matters set out as requiring unanimity by
section 41. They are, consequently, also section 38(1) matters. Finally, the proposed section
2, which includes the "distinct society" clause, is probably not contemplated by section 41. In
other words, each of the substantive modifications to federal and provincial legislative powers,
and the proposed "distinct society" clause could have been ratified under the general formula
of section 38. The major problem with this device for achieving ratification of the Meech
Lake Accord, however, was that it could not have been used in respect of the proposed
modifications to the amending formula which telescope section 42 matters into the unanimity
provision of section 41. A Quebec veto over future section 42 amendments, therefore, could
not have been generated through the section 38 procedure.
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out in its schedule - there is a strong argument that its terms could
not have been severed.117
It follows from the above recital that none of the alternatives
to outright ratification available in early 1990 were either constitu-
tionally easy to effect or politically advisable. Indeed the unsavoury
spectacle of the last-minute negotiations of June 1990 are
confirmation of the fact. Each of the "fall-back" positions just
reviewed would have implied that good political ends should always
trump difficult to negotiate constitutional means; and was it not,
after all, just this kind of thinking which produced the Constitution
Act, 1982 that led to Quebec's current discontent? Sometimes
catharsis is preferable to deviousness. Since a constitution and its
processes have sacred overtones in any polity, any further defilement
of Canadian constitutionalism purportedly in the cause of political
virtue would have had little to recommend it.
As a final point, it is important to recall the symbolic
purpose of the Meech Lake Accord. Given its political objectives -
first, that the Canadian constitutional process, including the
patriation exercise of 1982, be legitimated with Quebec's principal
political elites, and second, that the rest of the country recognize
and reaffirm the impeccable pedigree of the compact theoiy of the
Constitution Act, 1867, according it its proper place in contemporary
constitutional rhetoric and interpretation - anything short of
ratification in a spirit of generosity and inclusiveness would have
been self-defeating. One does not generate a passion for
heterogenity, a tolerance for difference, and a sensitivity to the
importance of constitutional legitimacy in Quebec by artifices such
as those advanced by those who sought to save the Meech Lake
Accord in the spring of 1990. Neither does one reconcile Quebec
to the full panoply of other issues in modern Canadian
constitutionalism by making its concerns, already once cast aside if
117 While a number of answers might have been given to this objection, it is not
necessary to address them here since it is also the case that were there the political will to
do so, the Meech Lake Accord (minus the amending formula) could simply be re-ratified by
resolution of seven provinces having an aggregate of ninety per cent of the population of all
the provinces, and of the Parliament of Canada. Assuming such political will to have existed,
the obvious political retort of the Meech Lake Accords opponents would then have been that,
if re-ratification were necessary, the obvious technical defects in the current Meech Lake
Accord should be corrected before such a new ratification round was launched.
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not directly rejected in 1982, contingent upon the prior or
contemporaneous ratification of a parallel Accord oriented to the
agenda of a third party. Far from the Meech Lake Accord requiring
a companion parallel Accord, one might reasonably say that the
Meech Lake Accord was itself the delayed parallel Accord which
ratification of the Charter package by all governments other than
that of Quebec made necessary.
In order to complete the argument raised in the last
paragraph, it is important to acknowledge that outright ratification
of the Meech Lake Accord would not have settled constitutional
conflicts over English/French relations - be these in Quebec or
elsewhere, be these federal/provincial or interprovincial - once and
for all. These types of issues cannot (and should not) be definitively
settled by historically contingent constitutional formulae. The
processes of interaction, of accommodation, of maturation, and of
mutual understanding between English and French-speaking
Canadians would have continued through ordinary processes of
political adjustment, complete with the errors of judgment which
politics occasionally produces. These processes may perhaps even
have led to the negotiation of a Meech Lake Accord II or a Meech
Lake Accord III at some time in the future. But at the very least,
a perception of legitimation and recognition would have resulted
from ratification of the present Meech Lake Accord; and this
changed perception would have helped to bring about a more candid
dialogue between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians
through which political and constitutional trust could have been
built.
Surprisingly, even though it was apparent by late 1989 that
there were no acceptable fall-back positions by which the Meech
Lake Accord could be engrafted onto the Constitution, few political
leaders who opposed the Meech Lake Accord thought it necessary
to work out a viable "eit strategy" once the symbolic deadline for
ratification passed. As events in Quebec after 23 June 1990
illustrated, it was naive to believe that the status quo would be an
acceptable outcome. Several commentators saw clearly that rejection
of the Meech Lake Accord would not be cost-free, and indeed would
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be more costly than the purported costs of ratification. 118 Four of
the many costs of rejection predicted then are now becoming
apparent. First, the feeling of betrayal felt by even strong federalists
in Quebec who have waited since 1980 for full delivery on the
promise of renewed federalism. Second, the postponing of
constitutional negotiations to accommodate other pressing pan-
Canadian interests - Aboriginal rights, fisheries, regional economic
disparities, Western alienation, provincehood for the territories, the
environment, political empowerment for under-enfranchised groups
and minorities - legitimately crying for attention. Third, the further
confirmation that Canada has moved from a political state of
tolerance and rationality to a legalistic state of unchecked spheres of
power and absolute individual rights. Finally, the inevitable slide,
fuelled by feelings of suspicion and hostility between French and
English-speaking Canadians in all parts of the country, to the
disintegration of the constitutional framework put into place in 1867.
Briefly, ratification would not have put an end to constitutional
negotiation over the survivance agenda; but it would have kept the
debate on reasonably familar ground. Rejection has irredeemably
changed that ground.
Whatever may have been the perception elsewhere in the
country, for many French-speaking Quebeckers of moderate political
tendencies, an emotional commitment to Canada stood or fell on the
outcome of the Meech Lake Accord process. The uncompromising
national centralist discourse championed by Pierre Trudeau no
longer is heard on the streets in Quebec; almost all political
discussion is carried on in varying degrees of decentralist rhetoric.
Rejection of the Meech Lake Accord has meant the final rejection
of the 1867 model of federalism in Quebec. Rejection of the
Meech Lake Accord has also put the Quebec government in a
difficult political position. If the Meech Lake Accord was indeed
Canada's bona fide response to the promise of renewed federalism,
but could not garner enough support in other provinces to achieve
118 I was one of those who attempted to demonstrate what these costs might be. As I
noted in the first part of this essay, it was the assessment of these costs which led me to
change my position on the advisability of ratification during the autumn of 1989. The next
few paragraphs are written in the present tense even though they are an essentially unedited
reproduction of the text of the Laskin Lecture delivered in November 1989.
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ratification, then another "sovereignty" referendum would seem to be
inevitable1 9 Further, with between one-half and two-thirds of the
population of Quebec (depending on the poll) now saying it would
vote yes to even an unequivocal independence question in a
projected 1992 referendum, unlike the situation prevailing in the
early 1980s, there will be very few French-speaking Quebeckers
willing to take up the cause of renewed federalism, whatever be the
federalist model selected.
The second cost of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord
has been constitutional inertia. Most Canadians are "fed up" with
the Constitution. Even assuming that the Quebec government does
not decide to invoke a process leading to the province's political
independence, what incentive does it have for agreeing to any
further constitutional negotiations that do not put its concerns first?
For those who believed that there was an unfinished agenda of
constitutional reform, ratification of the Meech Lake Accord was a
way of keeping this agenda alive; rejecting the Meech Lake Accord
has proven to be a way of placing obstacles in the way of further
constitutional renovation 20 This cost of rejection is especially
poignant (and ironic) for Native Canadians who have suffered eight
years of constitutional frustration waiting to get to the top of the
agenda, only to see the hurdle represented by Quebec's exclusion in
1982 still in place after six years of effort devoted to its removal.
Yet a third element to be factored into any post-Meech Lake
Accord equation is the fate of Canada's various provincial linguistic
minorities, under a legalistic constitutional ethic which denies them
standing as objects of regard. For there is no doubt that much of
the intellectual resistence to the Meech Lake Accord was rooted in
an excessively individualistic and rights-based account of political
obligation. - This revolutionary alteration in Canadian consti-
119 For confirmation, see the positions taken in the Allaire Report, supra, note 36 and
Quebec, National Assembly, Report of the BlangerlCampeau Commizsion: L'avenir du Quebec
(26 March 1991)
120 While there are many issues - such as Senate reform, multiculturalism, Aboriginal
rights, fisheries, and, perhaps, even the accession of the Territories to provincial status - which
can be dealt with without Quebec's concurrence under the 7/50 per cent formula of section
38, current events have shown that an unwilling Quebec can severely disrupt the normal
processes of constitutional negotiation by which these issues are addressed, or even prevent
them from commencing.
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tutionalism, given a significant boost by the 1982 Charter, augurs
badly for the country's various linguistic minorities seen as such.
Consider, for example, the case of the English-speaking minority in
Quebec. Rejection of the Meech Lake Accord has put it in a
difficult position. Should it align itself more closely with French-
speaking Quebec so as to avoid being marginalized were the
province to attempt to withdraw from Canada? Or should it cast its
lot unequivocally with Canada in the hope it will be rescued (in the
manner of Northern Ireland) following Quebec independence? 121
Similar uncertainties face Canada's French-speaking minorities
outside Quebec. With the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord
comes the rejection of a view of Canada which rests on the
celebration of cultural/linguistic duality and distinctiveness.
Whatever barriers to neglect and indifference that remain if Quebec
withdraws from active participation in the Canadian polity will
clearly be insufficient to prevent the rapid assimilation of most
Francophones living outside Quebec. The Canada envisioned by
many opponents of the Meech Lake Accord is a radically different
Canada than that which has existed since at least 1774. It is a
Canada which rests on the formal equality of individuals qua
individuals and not on the substantive equality of persons as
members of affective communities. 122
A final cost of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, a cost
implicit in the three other costs just reviewed, is the rejection of the
constitutional structure of the country as it has existed since 1867.
There are two points to be made here. First, this rejection, and its
resulting transformation of the country need not necessarily occur by
121 As the election of four Equality Party candidates from West-Central Montreal in the
provincial election of September 1989 suggests, already many members of the English-speaking
community are hedging their bets on the future of Quebec in Canada. A number are even
asking the question only William Shaw, a West-Island MNA in the late 1970s, dared ask in
1980 during the referendum campaign: "[G]iven Quebec's separation from Canada, should
English-speaking areas of the province separate from Quebec?" Whatever may be the
emotional appeal of such arguments, to my mind, their practical effect is not attractive, as the
precedents of racial and religious conflict in some of the world's other divided cities attest.
122 It is important to signal that the claim in the text does not depend on one having
taken a position on the debate in political theory between "liberals" and "communitarians."
There are thoughtful essays in each tradition which provide theoretical support for the claim
about substantive equality here argued. See for example, Taylor, Alternative Futures, supra
note 46 on the one hand, and Kymlicka, Liberalism, supra, note 2 on the other.
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means of a revolutionary event. Quebec now has a sophisticated
entrepreneurial class; market-oriented business people as well as
social engineers have the ear of the government. One can assume
that no precipitous event likely to paralyze the economy, greatly
jeopardize Quebec's bond ratings, or significantly disrupt offshore
investment will be taken. Rather, Quebec may decide simply to
withdraw from the political life of the country. Economic links with
the United States, already enhanced by the Free Trade Agreement,
would be strengthened further. Gradually, through investment from
the Caisse de ddp6t et de placement, Quebec's primary industries
would be repatriated and the government would become an
aggressive joint-venturer in high-tech sectors, and provincial
economic policy would increasingly take its own course. Strict
political independence is no longer necessary (or possible) in a world
of multilateral trade agreements. The real disintegration of Canada
probably will not come irreversibly through an easily recognizable
political act. It is already underway, much less perceptibly, through
a transition in elite attitudes from attachment, to suspicion, to
frustration, to indifference.
Second, the "disintegration of the country" means only the
disintegration of the constitutional structure put in place in 1867.
The failure of the Meech Lake Accord does not signal that the
political entity called Canada, nor even the bulk of the territory
which comprises it, will disappear. In other words, even those who
tried to think an exit strategy for a rejection of the Meech Lake
Accord through to the point of considering the possibility of the
breakup of the country were uncertain exactly how this breakup
might play itself out. Many who took a hard line on the Meech
Lake Accord assumed that if rejection were to drive a wedge
between Quebec and Ottawa, the fissure would lie along the Ottawa
and Matepedia rivers. Quebec would withdraw from the federation,
leaving nine provinces with English-speaking majorities plus the
territories behind. But there are several reasons why this may not
be the most likely scenario. One of the alternate scenarios merits
brief mention here. To the extent that the Constitution Act, 1867
was not just the Canadian confederative document, but was also the
fifth reconstitution of the relationship between French and English-
speaking peoples of what is now Central Canada, it was also a
recognition of the extent to which the fates of Upper Canada
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(Canada West, Ontario) and Lower Canada (Canada East, Quebec)
are intertwined. If anything, their economies and demographics have
become even more closely connected since Confederation. Is it a
foregone conclusion that Ontario would (if put to the choice) cast
its lot with the Maritimes and the West should Quebec feel that an
evolutionary constitutionalism in Canada is no longer achievable?
How paradoxical that the United Canadas, having sought
Confederation in 1867 in part to break a cultural/linguistic political
deadlock, might together be compelled by some of their other
partners to threaten withdrawal from the larger federation which
they engineered (reclaiming the name which they gave it) because
of a cultural/linguistic political deadlock on a question about which
they more or less agree.1 23
The listing of some of the costs which are now flowing from
the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord, should not be taken as
proof that there are no grounds for a more optimistic prognosis.
The observations which follow are grounded in a refusal to accept
the rhetoric of failure which the Meech Lake Accord ratification
debate and its aftermath seems to have generated. As a political
state, Canada has not failed. While it is true that the ratification
debate touched raw nerves about bilingualism in parts of the
country, and while it is true that it has also raised a spectre of
xenophobia about immigrants and multiculturalism in other parts, the
real achievements of the country in these domains and the passion
of most Canadians - whether English or French-speaking - for the
values of tolerance and diversity cannot be overlooked. In their
haste to emphasize the negativity of flag-desecrations, of declarations
of municipal unilingualism, of reactions to the accommodation of
cultural and spiritual differences of immigrants, Canadians often
forget the remarkable sociological feat which is their country. This
feat includes: the celebration of diversity prompted by the influx of
immigrants, comprising one-third its total population, and two-thirds
123 In presenting this alternative, I am not claiming that this is the most likely outcome.
But what would the position of Ontario, and New Brunswick for that matter, be if in the
negotiations for Quebec's withdrawal from the confederation, the governments of Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia insisted that the policy of federal official
bilingualism be abandoned? In other words, I believe that there are circumstances which
would make Ontario's choice quite difficult, and that some of these are not implausible, once
the process of negotiating the breakup of the country begins.
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in some major metropolitan areas; the successful bilingualization of
many government services, and the generation of an ethic of
bilingualism which sees a higher percentage of children in second-
language immersion classes than anywhere else in the world.12 4
Both of these are remarkable accomplishments which cannot be
allowed to drop from popular consciousness in political disputes
about responsibility for the failure of the Meech Lake Accord.125
But this is not to say that there are no important cleavages
in Canadian popular consciousness. If anything, the Meech Lake
Accord ratification process revealed just how powerful these
cleavages were.126 For most French-speaking Canadians, as the
previous sections of this essay have attempted to illustrate, la
survivance has always been the dominant theme. Since 1867, this
theme has had three main variations: federal bilingualism; a degree
of autonomy for Quebec's governmental institutions in order to
reflect the distinctiveness of the province; and, especially since the
Quiet Revolution, the relatively closer identification of the nation
with the state. These three variations reflect two important axes of
political action: the notion of bilingualism as a commitment of the
federal government - to the individual citizen qua citizen; and the
notion of the state's responsibility (especially in Quebec) to re-
balance socio-economic forces that threaten to assimilate the weaker
124 See Canada, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, A Partial Thaw:
Annual Report, 1990 (Ottawa: The Commissioner, 25 March 1991) [hereinafter Partial Thaw]
which tracks these various achievements.
125 Of course, to signal these achievements in respect of non-indigenous peoples is also
to highlight the tragedy of the treatment of Native Canadians. In celebrating achievements
one must always be aware of failings. For a powerful critique of how Canadians have been
unresponsive to Native interests, see R. Saganash, 'The Clash of Nationalisms" in Conference,
.supra, note 63.
126 The next six paragraphs of this essay are the only substantive additions to the text
of the Laskin Lecture as initially delivered. Their formulation has been heavily influenced by
my experiences at two colloquia on Canada's constitutional future held at the Faculty of Law
of McGill University in 1990: (i) a symposium sponsored by the Friends of Meech Lake and
held on 19-20 January 1990, and (ii) a symposium entitled "Conference on the Future of
Quebec and Canada" held on 16-18 November 1990. Many of the ideas developed here are
drawn from several conversations I have had during the past eighteen months with Charles
Taylor. For a brief summary of his current views, see Collision Courses, supra, note 62 which
was delivered as the keynote address at the above-mentioned November symposium. I should
also like to acknowledge the assistance of my colleague, Nicholas Kasirer, whose keen insight
helped me to formulate more persuasively the themes of this concluding section.
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French-language community. That these two axes need not be
incompatible, despite the attempts by political leaders such as Pierre
Trudeau and Ren6 Lvesque to suggest they are, is an important
fact to be recognized in future constitutional negotiations.
12 "
For most English-speaking Canadians, the past twenty-five
years have seen the transformation of the nationalist "survival myth,"
grounded in the United Empire Loyalist story,128 into a "civic
republican" nationalism capped off by the patriation exercise. This
nationalism now defines itself in the following three claims: that
one of Canada's aims is to create greater equality between regions,
or at least establish the governmental redistributive institutions which
track those of nineteenth century private charity; that Canada is a
socio-cultural mosaic (not a melting-pot) which brings unity and
harmony to people of diverse backgrounds; and that Canadians have
a common view of citizenship and the relationship of citizen to
government - a view which now finds its key expression in the
Charter. These three claims are the reflection of two ideas, and also
suggest two axes of government policy. One is what might be
characterized as an individualist liberal view of society which seeks
to limit all forms of state activity that might interfere with "rights."
The other is a thicker liberal view in which some common goals, as
embodied in various social programmes for example, are recognized
as being essential to understanding individual rights. Once again,
politicians such as Brian Mulroney and Preston Manning have
effectively conspired to set a public discourse which suggests the two
views of political obligation are incompatible, even though they are
not.12
9
127 For Trudeau's most recent views on the incompatibility of federal bilingualism and
"special status" for Quebec, see the Convocation Address he delivered at the Faculty of Law
of the University of Toronto on 21 March 1991, as reported in The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (22 March 1991) 1.
128 Perhaps the clearest exposition of this conception of English-speaking Canada's
traditional "survival myth" is that offered by George Grant. See Grant, supra, note 7.
129 For a discussion of the relationship between these two views in the context of deficits,
deregulation, privatization, and free trade (as these bear on governmental regulatory policy),
see R.A. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation by Regulations" in I. Bernier & A. Lajole,
eds, Regulations; Crown Corporations and Administrative Tribunals in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985) 111.
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Just as Canadian political and legal institutions have long
been a reflection of the possibility of reconciling the two axes of the
survivance theme for French-speaking Canadians,1 30 so too they,
including the Charter, have recognized the dual strains of the
survival motif of most English-speaking Canadians.131 For this
reason, none of the surface cleavages between the variations on the
nationalist survivance theme currently pursued in Quebec and the
variations on the "civic republican" nationalist theme which is gaining
ascendency elsewhere in Canada should be seen as unbridgeable.
To begin, despite the apparent symbolic conflicts between
the themes of pan-Canadian bilingualism and the multicultural
mosaic, these goals are not irreconcilable. The possibility of
achieving their reconciliation through a bilingual multiculturalism
requires only two adjustments in Canadian attitudes. Within
Quebec, it demands the embrace of a multicultural francophonie;
outside Quebec, it compels resistence to attempts to water down or
roll back bilingualism. Of course, given that certain Quebec
nationalists are still playing the "disparaitre" tune, and given that
calls for a reassessment of bilingualism now seem to be gaining some
currency in the West, the difficulties of achieving such an
accommodation should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, there
are signs that a consensus on how to marry bilingualism and
multiculturalism can be reached.132
The second apparent conflict exists between greater
autonomy (now imperfectly formulated and understood as "special
status") for Quebec and a concept of shared commitments and
solidarity (now imperfectly understood as absolute equality of the
provinces) among all regions of Canada. In practical terms, these
130 For a detailed inventory of these accommodations, see section III of this essay,
"Constitutional Interpretations," and section IV, "Constitutional Histories," supra, note 1 at 278
and 307, respectively.
131 For an early illustration of the tensions within the Charter, see R.A. Macdonald,
"Postscript and Prelude - The Jurisprudence of the Charter. Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct
L Rev. 321. But compare, for an alternative reading of the Charter, D.M. Beatty, Talking
Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of Constitutional Review (Toronto:
Carswell, 1990), who would prefer that the Supreme Court clearly fix the interpretation of the
Charter in a monist, individualist orbit.
132 See Partial Thaw, supra, note 124 for statistics reporting the progress of bilingualism
since 1968.
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two themes need not point to irreconcilable constitutional claims.
True equality of the provinces does not mean reducing all provinces
to the same level. It means treating provinces equally in respect of
issues where they are equal. The Senate may well be one of those
domains where equal representation would permit the West to
achieve a just and proper measure of political influence in Ottawa.
The constitutionalization of regional equalization payments may
reflect a'just and proper means to overcome the economic inequality
of the Maritimes and, perhaps, Manitoba. The establishment of
Aboriginal self-government on a provincial or even on a more
autonomous basis could be a just and proper structure of
empowerment for Native Canadians. In other words, complex
equality does not mean that those accommodations of Quebec's
particularity, arrived at in 1867 (and those developed since), cannot
be re-evaluated and, if necessary, extended in the future. Here,
what is required is much more subtle discourse of provincial equality
than that currently being offered by Premiers Clyde Wells and Don
Getty.
The key challenge for Canada's future, however, lies in
finding ways of mediating the third surface cleavage: that is, the
conflict between the misreading of the Charter, which sets it up only
as a peon to individual rights, and the misreading of Quebec
nationalism which sees it as a thinly disguised xenophobia and
racism.133 But to find the terms of reconciliation here, it will be
necessary, in any reconstruction of the Canadian Constitution, to
accomplish two goals. The moderates among those who espouse
what Alan Cairns has called "Charter patriotism" will have to come
to see that they have been sold an impoverished view of what
"rights" are, and that there is room in their conception of the bases
of the country, as it now exists, for recognizing Quebec's
particularity. It will be crucial to illustrate how the actual text of
the Charter mandates an interpretation which includes the possibility
of it bearing somewhat differently on the activity of the Quebec
133 A classic example of this latter misreading is the report submitted to Gerry Weiner,
Minister of State for Multiculturalism on 22 March 1991 which suggests that nationalism in
Quebec is just a cover for "racism." See 'Racism Alive, Well in Quebec: Report" The
[Montreal] Gazette (23 March 1991) Al and P. Wells, 'Nationalism Not Racist Landry Says"
The [Montreal] Gazette (24 March 1991) Al.
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government1 34 Conversely, more moderate Quebec nationalists will
have to come to see that their thicker liberal (or even
communitarian) view of society does not mean either that there are
no "fundamental rights" or that one need not be open and generous
to difference1 35
The current constitutional impasse results because Canadians,
and especially Canadian political elites, have been unwilling to
depart from the modem versions of the twin nationalist myths -
survivance as patriotic statism, and Charter patriotism - which have
structured debate about constitutional renewal for at least twenty
years. The reluctance of ordinary Canadians to accept that these
myths encompass at least three different cleavages means that
something akin to Rawls' notion of overlapping consensus is never
advanced as a possible ground for pursuing, or justification for
finding, constitutional agreement.13 6 The failure of political elites to
depart from patterns of almost cynical manipulation of (as in the
1982 patriation process), or almost wilful disregard for (as in the
1987 Meech Lake Accord process), the attitudes and beliefs of
ordinary Canadians has exacerbated this monotheistic inclination. In
other words, the desire to articulate a single theoretical foundation
for all manner of political institutions makes it difficult for
Canadians to accept that there could be at least two interpretive
positions which might be adopted to justify any particular
134 The idea here is that Charter patriots need to be offered a theory of the document
wherein it is recognized that the attempt to further a particular culture need not necessarily
rest on anti-liberal premises. They will also have to accept that certain laws such as Bill 101
do not "override" fundamental rights, and that it is possible to espouse substantive goals in a
way which does not discriminate against those who do not belong to the dominant culture.
For the roots of the arguments which could be made along these lines, see Kymlicka,
Liberalism, supra, note 2.
135 Put positively, they will have to recognize that the attempt to articulate a series of
fundamental rights which are immune to governmental limitation, and the claim for recognition
of difference are not necessarily incompatible with the legislative furtherance of a particular
culture, even if they constrain some of the mechanisms by which such a goal is pursued. For
an attempt to trace out such an understanding, see Taylor, Collision Courses, supra, note 63.
136 For development of this idea see J. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus"
(1987) 7 Ox. J. Leg. Stud. 1; and J. Rawls, "The Domain of the Political and Overlapping
Consensus" (1989) 64 N.Y.U.L Rev. 233.
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constitutional artifact.137  But if Canadians are prepared to seek
institutional structures and governmental processes around which an
overlapping consensus can emerge, these structures can be invoked
to breed reconciliation and creative tension, not anger and
separateness l38 Whether exercises like the Spicer Commission and
its equivalents in various provinces will assist Canadians to see these
possibilities and to insist that their governments pursue them, is as
yet an open question.13 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
While ostensibly about the Meech Lake Accord, and
ostensibly in some measure an argument that the Meech Lake
Accord should have been ratified, this essay has really been about
patterns of Canadian consitutionalism. It has evoked the myths,
interpretive structures, histories, motifs, and symbols of Canadian
137 This, of course, is a claim (at the level of political theory) similar to that made when
the analogy of the particle and wave theories of light was invoked as an explanation of the
history of Canadian constitutionalism and the underlying structure of the Constitution Act;
1867. See Part I of this essay, supra, note 1 at 292.
138 For a very thoughtful (and prescient) synthesis of the strains which are threatening
the fabric of the Constitution Act, 1867, and for a series of recommendations for constitutional
renovation not unlike those implicit in this essay, see A. Abel, "A Chart for a Charter" (1976)
25 U.N.B.L.J. 20. For further development (although incomplete in many places) of Abel's
thesis, see 3. Laskin, "Albert Abel's Constitutional Charter for Canada" (1978) 28 U.T.L.J.
261.
139 While this essay accepts the "theoretical" democratization of constitutional politics
in the post-Charter era, it does not accept either that such democratization has actually
occurred, or that constitutional Charters are the preferred vehicle for accomplishing this goal.
Moreover, the argument of the essay is to deny that what Alan Cairns has called
"constitutional minoritarianism" is a sufficient conception of constitutional process. Political
leaders (call them elites if need be) are necessary in representative democracies.
But, because none of those leaders who supported the Meech Lake Accord have
any credibility in the opposing constituency (and vice versa), and because it is the people and
politicians outside Quebec who now have the initiative, if the constitutional process is to
become unblocked (which the Spicer Commission suggests that Canadians really want), it will
require a remarkable conversion - not unlike that of Guy Carieton in the 1760s or George
Brown in the 1860s - by a hard-line anti-Quebec politician. See J.M. Careless, Canada.- A
Story of Challenge (Toronto: Methuen, 1963) at 102 on Carleton's change of positions, and
at 233-35 for a review of Brown's conversion. Unfortunately, however, by contrast with
Canada's two constitutional precedents, no such public-spirited and "great-souled" candidate
seems likely to emerge in the 1990s.
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politics in an effort to illustrate the fundamental duality which has
attended constitutional understanding in Canada since 1774. Given
its particular focus, the exploration of other themes - be they
constitutive, as in the case of Aboriginal rights and Western
alienation, or substantive, as in the case of economic redistribution
and environmental issues - has been largely implicit. But the
significance of these other themes for constitutional redesign is
clearly acknowledged.
As in the period between the Imperial Statutes of 1774 and
1791, and again as in the period between the Imperial Statutes of
1840 and 1867, since the Canada Act 1982, Canadians have been
engaged in a great construction of their political and social
institutions. The pattern of these "great constructions," it seems, is
clearly established. A first, centralizing attempt at constitutional
design (in 1774, to erect the fourteenth British North American
Colony on the model of New France rather than that of New
England; in 1841, to make the United Canadas over into a
traditional, assimilationist British Colony) was followed by a second,
decentralizing attempt at constitutional redesign (in 1791, to permit
protestant, English-speaking Upper Canada to carve out a "distinct
identity" from Catholic, French-speaking Lower Canada; in 1867, to
permit the benefits of Intercolonial Union to be achieved while
permitting Catholic, French-speaking Lower Canada to carve out a
"distinct identity" from the other three confederating colonies). In
the eighteenth century great construction, the institutional
framework was colonial and pre-federalist; in the nineteenth century
great construction, it was locally post-colonial (and emerging nation-
statist) and federalist; in the twentieth century, it will probably be
both post-nation-statist (and emerging transnational) and post-
federal.
Just as the Act of 1840 was an unsuccessful attempt to save
certain key elements of the more centrifugal compromise of 1791 by
a centralizing strategy which failed to recognize the dual nature of
that initial compromise, the Constitution Act, 1982 was an attempt
to save certain features of the more centrifugal compromise of 1867
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by a centralizing strategy which also failed to recognize the dual
nature of the earlier compromise. Just as the 1791 decentralization
was provoked in part by a changing constituency of those entitled to
constitutional regard (the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists)
from that existing previously, and by a changing structure of
constitutional entitlement (the notion of an elected legislative
assembly in addition to a wholly appointed legislative council), the
1867 decentralization was also provoked in part by a changing
constituency of those entitled to constitutional regard (the addition
of two Maritime provinces) from that existing previously, and by a
changing structure of constitutional entitlement (the achievment of
responsible government). One already knows that the decen-
tralization of the 1990s will be provoked in part by a changing
constituency of those entitled to constitutional regard (in particular
Aboriginal peoples and Canada's multicultural communities), and by
a changing structure of constitutional entitlement (as reflected in the
attribution of judicially enforceable "legal rights and fundamental
freedoms" through the Charter).
It follows that the post-Meech Lake Accord pattern of
Canadian constitutionalism will most likely depart substantially from
that known heretofore. While the 1990s version of Canada's
constitution will be quite different from that of 1867, it will be no
more so than that of 1867 was different from that of 1841 or 1791.
Whether the country that emerges thereafter will redefine itself with
greatly increased power to constituent units hedged in by explicit
civil-libertarian side-constraints, whether it will emerge as an
essentially economic confederation rather than a political federation,
or whether it will consciously seek to define itself by reference to an
amalgam of liberal and communitarian virtues such as bilingualism,
multiculturalism, tolerance, and distinctiveness cannot be predicted
confidently. But if Canada is seen fundamentally as a linguistic,
cultural, and social redistributive commitment rather than as a purely
territorial construct or as a particular nineteenth century constitu-
tional arrangment, then the prognosis for its survival as a hetero-
nomous political community is good.140
140 The term "heteronomous" is consciously chosen. It captures the idea that the whole
can be "composed of parts or elements of different kinds." See Chambers Eymological English
Dictionary, entry under "heterogeneous." In the view argued here, the components of the
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In the Laskin Lecture of November 1989 the future of
Canada was cast in the language of its current constitutional
arrangements. It was argued that if the Meech Lake Accord were
to be ratified, the country would have traversed two of the three
constitutional barriers standing in the way of the political
reconstruction of post-War Canada: these barriers being, first, the
achievement of statehood and the crystalization of those peculiarly
Canadian understandings of liberalism through patriation and the
Charter - a reflection of the statute thesis of the Constitution Act,
1867; and second, the achievement of a renewed commitment to a
Canada originating in an agreement between French and English-
speaking peoples and a revived focus on group interests and claims
through the recognition of Quebec's special role in Confederation
- a reflection of the compact thesis of the Consitution Act, 1867. It
would then have remained in the Meech Lake Accord I, or what-
ever the next round of constitutional negotiations might have been
labelled, to set about resolving Canada's dilemmas relating to the
claims of Native peoples, to the promotion of the country's
multicultural heritage, and to overcoming regional (especially
Western) alienation - each of these being the pendants of an
emerging "states rights" thesis of Canadian federalism.
Now that the Meech Lake Accord has failed, all bets for
saving either the rhetoric of "federalism" or the interpretive frames
of the Constitution Act, 1867 are off. But assuming the will not to
seek a monolithic theoretical ground for constitutional renegotiation,
and also assuming the will to approach the exercise with a
commitment to preserving the plurality of the assizes of Canadian
constitutionalism exist, one should be confident about a successful
conclusion to the country's twentieth century great reconstruction.
Given these assumptions, one should also be confident that Canada's
recent struggle for constitutional renovation will ultimately result in
the achievement of a reformed and rewritten Canadian Constitution
polity are heterogeneous, and the political theory which grounds its institutions and processes
are heterogeneous. Only its basic texts (its Constitution) need be singular. Two of the best
discussions of the influence of language, culture, economics, and geography on the hetero-
nomous character of the country are, A. Johnson, "The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada"
(1968) 1 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 18 and Laskin, supra, note 138, passim, but especially at 265-73.
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responsive to all these various assizes - the present discord about
the failure of Meech Lake to the contrary notwithstanding.1 41
141 Since there are so many key policy issues confronting Canadians which have not been
addressed directly in this text, I should like to add, by way of a brief postscript, four
observations about the relationship of constitutional renovation to these other concerns.
First, whatever position one takes on the future of relations between English and
French-speaking Canadians, the claims of Canada's Aboriginal peoples will have to be
addressed. Separation (or renewed federalism) will not "resolve" the Native question either
in Quebec or in the rest of Canada. But settling, one way or the other, the internal "white
man's squabble," as Romeo Saganash called it (see supra, note 125), may be a prerequisite to
addressing conscientiously the historically prior "First Nations" question. For this reason,
Elijah Harper may have gained a tactical victory but suffered a temporary strategic loss.
Second, while the particular approach to addressing the cultural/linguistic concerns
emanating from Quebec chosen by Prime Minister Mulroney may seem to have been of a
piece with the "free trade" initiative, the two are severable. Quebec or no Quebec, the issue
of international trade policy remains. Free trade or no free trade, the Quebec question
remains. Moreover, it is unfair, as commentators like Phillip Resnick have done (see Resnick
supra, note 78), to blame Quebec for forcing free trade on Canada just because its Premier
supported the initiative. Quebec voters had many reasons, including the negotiation of the
Meech Lake Accord, for voting for the federal Conservative Party in 1988.
Third, the focus on the Constitution rather than on substantive governmental
programs is a legacy of the Charter. To accuse Quebec of continually pushing the
constitutional agenda is to mistake the symptom for the disease, as Michael Mandel
convincingly demonstrates [see M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of
Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989)]. Constitutional structures allocate
power to address social and economic problems; rarely in Canada do they themselves
determine legislative policy outcomes, except in matters of language and culture. The mistake
is in letting the details of constitutionalism and intergovernmental relations pre-empt
discussion on questions of economic and social policy.
Fourth, regardless of the outcome of any future constitutional/political process,
Canadians will have to deal with gender inequalities, with discrimination in all its forms, with
environmental degradation, with poverty, with public health issues, with family violence, and
with racial intolerance. The only question on the table, as Premier Rae of Ontario
acknowledged, is whether these issues - which are among the most important of the
substantive raisons d'etre of any political structure - will be addressed by Canada as we know
it today, or by some other political structure.
Not losing sight of these issues during processes of constitutional renovation will
be an important challenge over the next eighteen months. Using them to avoid embarking on
processes of constitutional renovation will mean simply that neither goal will be achieved.

